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Jacques writes a novel in French. James translates it into English. Jim writes a play
based on James's translation. Jimmy makes the play into a movie. Mel records the
movie on a videocassette without the permission of Jacques, James, Jim or Jimmy.
Advise Mel concerning his potential copyright liability.
I. INTRODUCTION
No one, other than a student writing an examination in a course on the
law of copyright, is likely to receive such a request for advice. But the prob-
lem itself is not as important as the process it illustrates, that is, the contri-
bution of further creative effort to an existing intellectual product to produce
a new and different intellectual product. This new creation is known in copy-
right law as a "derivative work".
Canadian copyright law does not employ the designation "derivative
work".1 The term is not used in the Canadian Copyright Act,2 nor is it re-
ferred to by Dr. Fox, in his treatise, The Canadian Law of Copyright.3 None-
theless, translations, musical arrangements, dramatizations, fictionalizations,
motion picture versions, sound recordings, engravings, photographs, abridge-
ments and condensations-all examples of derivative works-are directly or
indirectly dealt with in the Canadian Act. But no attempt has yet been made to
examine the various kinds of derivative works under any single heading even
though many of the underlying conceptual issues and policy questions are
common to such works. This article seeks to survey the full range of tradi-
tional derivative works, to critically examine the present Canadian law of
copyright pertaining to them and, in view of the impending revision of the
Canadian Act,4 to make specific proposals for legislative reform.
Copyright rewards creativity by granting the creator of an original work
the exclusive right to exploit, in a number of specific fashions, the product
of his labour. Various theories have been offered to explain why copyright
law has developed, ranging from recognition by statute of a natural property
right,5 or the implementation of a social contract between the state and
1 Compare the Copyright Act of 1976 17 U.S.C., § 101:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion pic-
ture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work".
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, formerly cited as the Copyright Act, 1921, [hereinafter
Canadian Act].
S Fox, The Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs (2d ed. Toronto:
Carswell, 1967) [hereinafter Fox].
4 "Copyright Act to be revised," The Globe & Mail (Toronto), July 17, 1981 at
B-2, col. 5. "Andr6 Ouellet, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, and Francis
Fox, Communications Minister, have instructed their departmental officials to prepare
legislative proposals to revise Canada's copyright act within the next 12 months."
5 Roberts, Canadian Copyright: Natural Property or Mere Monopoly (1979), 40
C.P.R. (2d) 33 and Keyes and Brunet, A Rejoinder to "Canadian Copyright: Natural
Property or Mere Monopoly" (1979), 40 C.P.R. (2d) 54.
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creator,6 to a legislative endorsement of a practice of 'fair play' for creators;7
but all the theories fuse into a common objective-to reward the creator. In
implementing that goal, any copyright statute, regardless of the theoretical
basis of the legislation, must balance the interests of the creator in controlling
his creation against the rival interests of the public in having greater access
to the creation. The Canadian Act does so by granting a monopoly, but one
limited both in scope and duration, as will be discussed in later paragraphs.
A wide range of creative efforts are protected by the Canadian Act. Not
only are the traditional skills-those of the author, the artist, the playwright
and the composer-rewarded by the grant of copyright but so also are those
of the photographer, the film-maker and the sound recorder. Copyright law
does not, however, attempt to assess the aesthetic quality or artistic merit of
a work, not, at least, in determining whether copyright subsists in it.8 So an
accountant's tax tablesO are as likely to be protected as the poet's verse.
A derivative work, by definition, involves a second tier of creative effort
superimposed upon that of the underlying author. Derivative works can be
produced in essentially any one of three situations: first, where the underlying
work is in the public domain, that is, the underlying work is not or no longer
is, the subject of copyright; second, where there is copyright in the underlying
work and the owner of the copyright produces the derivative work; and third,
where the derivative work is produced by someone else, with or without the
permission of the owner of the copyright in the underlying work. As will be
demonstrated, different issues and problems arise, depending upon which of
these distinct situations is involved. But the core question to which all of the
specific issues ultimately return is: how should Canadian copyright law effect
its object of rewarding creativity where there are multiple creative efforts
involved in a single work? Much of the difficulty associated with derivative
works lies in attempting to reconcile and resolve the respective rights and
interests of the owner of the copyright in the underlying work with those of
the creator of the derivative work.
II. COPYRIGHT IN A DERIVATIVE WORK
The Canadian Act does not distinguish between derivative works
and underlying works. This is in sharp contrast to the Berne Conven-
0 Copyright in the United States is a matter of social contract, according to which
the state grants a monopoly to authors in order to persuade them to make their works
available. The Constitution of the United States of America, art. 1, s. 8, cI. 8 provides
that:
"mhe congress shall have power ... to promote the progress of a science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors.., to exclusive right to their
respective writings."
7 See Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs
(Cmnd. 6732, 1977) at 221, para. 872-74 [hereinafter the Whitford Report in ac-
knowledgement of the chairmanship of the Honourable Mr. Justice Whitford].
8 University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch.
601 at 608-609, 86 L.J. Ch. 107 at 111, 115 L.T. 301 at 303 per Peterson J. speaking
in reference to "literary works".
1) Collins v. Rosenthal (1974), 14 C.P.R. (2d) 143. (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
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tion ° which expressly provides for the grant of copyright in certain
derivative works:
Article 2(2) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other reproduc-
tions in an altered form of a literary or artistic work, as well as collections of
different works, shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the
rights of the author of the original work.
The Convention, the text of which is annexed to the Canadian Act as the
Third Schedule, does not, however, form part of Canadian copyright law"1
and no provision conforming to article 2 has been included in the copyright
statute.2-
In Canada, a derivative work is granted copyright if it is a "literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic work", and if it qualifies as "original". With
respect to the first requirement, the terms "literary", "dramatic", "musical"
and "artistic" work are all defined, or at least partially so, in the Canadian
Act and in many instances expressly include within their definitions various
10 The International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was
established by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(1886), 77 British and Foreign State Papers 22, as reproduced in (1886-1887), 168
C.T.S. 185 (French text). See also, (1887), 91 Parl. Papers 297 (C. 5167) (English
text). Great Britain, and thereby Canada, adhered to the Berne Convention of 1886.
The Berne Convention was revised at Paris in 1896 and Berlin in 1908. The Imperial
Copyright Act, 1911, 1-2 Geo. 5, c. 46, upon which the Canadian Act is modelled,
(The latter appears "loin a hasty reading", according to Dr. Fox, "as a topsy-turvy
imitation of the imperial Act ..... but a close examination will disclose some startling
discrepancies and additions." See Fox, Some Points of Interest in the Law of Copyright
(1945-46), 6 U.T.L.J. 100 at 138.) was enacted to conform to the Berlin Convention
of 1908. The Berne Convention was further revised at Rome in 1928, infra note 45.
Canada adhered to the Rome Revision and as a result the Canadian Act was amended
to accord with that Convention by The Copyright Amendment Act, 1931, S.C. 21 & 22
Geo. 5, c. 8, s. 12. Canada has not adhered to the substantive provisions of any further
revisions of the Berne Convention [Brussels (1948), Stockholm (1967) and Paris
(1971)]. One of the matters to be considered in discussing copyright reform is Canada's
future adherence to international conventions. For the purposes of this paper however,
it is assumed that Canada will remain a signatory to the Rome Revision and will not
sign any of the later revisions of the Berne Convention. See Torno, International Con-
siderations of Copyright Law Revision in Canada: International Obligations (Copyright
Revision Studies, Research and International Affairs Branch, Bureau of Corporate Af-
fairs, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, forthcoming). Unless otherwise indi-
cated all references throughout this paper to the Berne Convention are to the Rome
Text. Canada has adhered to the Universal Copyright Convention (1952, Geneva
Text) since Aug 10, 1962. Can. T.S. No. 13, 6 UST 2731, TIAS 3324, 216 UNTS 132.
'1 De Montigny v. Cousineau, [1950] S.C.R. 297 at 310, 10 Fox Pat. C. 161 at 172,
12 C.P.R. 45 at 57. Resort may be had to the Convention, however, to resolve an
ambiguity in the construction of the Canadian Act. For example, see Ludlow Music Inc.
v. Canint Music Corp., [1967], 2 Ex. C.R. 109 at 114-15, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 200 at 206,
51 C.P.R. 278 at 286-87.
12 "Members of the Union are obligated to protect the works enumerated in the
second paragraph of art. 2 the same as the 'literary and artistic works' enumerated
in its first paragraph. This is explicitly stipulated in the third paragraph, which contains
the pledge of all countries of the Union to secure protection for 'the works mentioned
above."' Ladas, 1 The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (New
York: MacMillan, 1938) at 242.
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derivative works. Photographs and engravings, for example, are found in the
definition of "artistic work". 13 Cinematographic films, which can also be
derivative works, are protected under a bifurcated system either as "dramatic
works" or "artistic works". 14 Sound recordings, also possible derivative
works, are protected by a special grant of copyright "in like manner as if such
contrivances were musical, literary, or dramatic works."'15 All of the deriva-
tive works mentioned earlier that are not expressly dealt with in the statute
will nonetheless qualify as one of the four types of work. A translation of
a novel, for instance, is just as much a literary work as the novel upon which
it is based even though the Canadian Act is silent on the matter.16
The statutory requirement of "originality" raises a problem peculiar to
all derivative works-their dependency upon the underlying work. One queries
whether a work based on an earlier work can at the same time be original.
In University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd. Peterson
J. considered the meaning of "original" in the context of the Imperial Copy-
right Act, 1911:17
The word "original" does not in this connection mean that the work must be the
expression of original or inventive thought .... mhe Act does not require that
the expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work must nor
be copied from another work-that it should originate from the author.' 8 (em-
phasis added)
While this passage may accurately describe the test of originality under
Canadian copyright law,' 9 it does not indicate how the test is to be applied
in the context of derivative works since all such works are, to a degree,
"copied from another work." Later cases make it clear, however, that the
prohibition against copying is not an absolute one. Rather, originality is to
be measured in relative terms looking to the author's independent input into
the existing work. If a sufficient amount of time, effort, judgment and skill
13 Canadian Act, s. 2 "artistic work."
14 Canadian Act, s. 2 "dramatic work" and s. 3 (1) (e).
15 Canadian Act, s. 4(3).
16 On literary works generally, see University of London Press Limited, supra note
8 at 608 (Ch.), 111 (L.J.Ch.), 302-303 L.T. ("the words 'literary work' cover work
which is expressed in print or writing, irrespective of the question whether the quality
or style is high"). Cf. text accompanying note 8. See also Bulman Group Ltd. v. Alpha
One-Write Systems B.C. (1981), 36 N.R. 192, 54 C.P.R. (2d) 179 (Fed. C.A.). The
Canadian Act, s. 2, defines "literary work" to include original productions such as
"maps, charts, plans, tables and compilations". (emphasis added)
17 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (U.K.), rep. by Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., c. 74
(U.K.). The Canadian Act, on the other hand, remains substantially as it was when
first enacted and thus is strikingly similar to the Copyright Act, 1911.
18 Supra note 8.
19 See, e.g., Underwriters Survey Bureau Ltd. v. American Home Fire Ass'ce Co.,
[1939] 4 D.L.R. 89 at 95 (Ex. Ct.); Ascot Jockey Club Ltd. v. Simons (1968), 64
W.W.R. 411 at 416-17, 39 Fox Pat. C. 52 at 56-57, 56 C.P.R. 122 at 127-28 (B.C.S.C.);
Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Rediffusion Inc., [1954] Ex. C.R. 382 at 398, 14 Fox Pat. C.
114 at 131-32, 20 C.P.R. 75 at 93-94; Hay v. Sloan, [1957] O.W.N. 445, 27 C.P.R.
132, 16 Fox Pat. C. 185 (Ont. H.C.); Silverson v. Neon Products Ltd., [1978] 6 W.W.R.
512 at 516 (B.C.S.C.).
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is exerted by the author the work will be original and entitled to copyright,20
although "a mere copyist has no right to obtain a copyright in his work."21
It is through the concept of originality that copyright law assesses whether
sufficient creative effort is involved in order to warrant the grant of a
monopoly.22
The application of this test of originality to derivative works varies with
the nature of the work. For some derivative works it will be a question of
degree whether their production involved sufficient time, skill and energy,
whereas with other derivative works the effort involved in transferring the
underlying work to a different medium will, by definition, satisfy the statutory
criterion of originality.
As an illustration of the first type of derivative work consider a new
arrangement or adaptation of an existing musical composition.23 Precisely
"[w]hat degree of originality is required to give rise to a separate copyright
in an arrangement or adaptation of a song,"2 4 was the question before Goff J.
in Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co.2 5 After reviewing the expert evi-
dence that had been led at trial Goff J. concluded:
It is perfectly plain that every musical arranger has a number of weapons in his
armoury which he may use, depending upon the purpose for which the arrange-
ment is required-ranging from simple arrangements for straight dance bands or
for some singers, to more sophisticated or original arrangements for more sub-
20 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 at
289, [1964] 1 All E.R. 465 at 478, 108 Sol. J. 135 at 135 per Lord Devlin (H.L.).
('"he requirement of originality means that the product must originate from the author
in the sense that it is the result of a substantial degree of skill, industry or experience
employed by him.") See The Bulman Group Ltd. v. "One Write" Accounting Systems
Ltd. (1982) 62 C.P.R. (2d) (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
21 Beullac Ltje v. Simard (1911), 39 Que. C.S. 97 at 101, ajf'd 39 Que. C.S. 517.
22 Compare L.B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Products Ltd., [1979] R.P.C. 551 at 568
per Whitford J. (Whether a work is original "must depend on whether sufficient
skill or labour or talent has gone into it to merit protection under the Act. It is always
a question of degree."), affd [1979] R.P.C. 611 (H.L.).
23 A "musical work" according to s. 2 of the Canadian Act "means any combination
of melody and harmony, or either of them printed, reduced to writing, or otherwise
graphically produced or reproduced." On the copyright status of a song see ATV Music
Publishing of Canada Ltd. v. Rogers Radio Broadcasting Ltd. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 417
(H. Ct).
24 Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co. Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 109 (Q.B. Div.)
at 114. See also Wood v. Boosey (1868), L.R. 3 Q.B. 223, 37 L.J. Q.B. 84, 18 L.T. 105;
Boosey v. Fairlie (1877), 7 Ch. D. 301 (C.A.) and Robertson v. Lewis, The Times
June 1, 1960, sub. nom Robertson v. Lewis (trading as Virginia Music), [1976] R.P.C.
169 (Ch. D.). Cf. Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. 73 F. Supp. 165,
74 U.S. Pat. Q. 264 (Dt. Ct. N.Y. 1947); Nom Music Inc. v. Kaisln 343 F. Supp. 198,
145 U.S. Pat. Q. 237 (2nd Cir. C.A. 1965); Shaw v. Time-Life Records 341 N.E. 2d
817, 38 N.Y.C.A. Rep. (2d) 201 (1975). Note that at least one commentator has rec-
ommended that the Canadian statute should expressly provide that new arrangements
of the musical works of others should not attract their own copyright. See Rogers,
Copyright Confusion (1947), 25 Can. B. Rev. 967 at 978.
25 See Bragiel, The Redwood Cases-The Commercial Significance of the Rever-
sionary Provisions of the Copyright Act 1956, [1981] 3 EIPR 91.
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stantial orchestras or for groups; but in nearly every case a musical arranger will
so decorate, develop, transfer to a different medium, or otherwise change the
simple music of a popular song as to make his arrangement fall within the
description of an original musical work and so be capable of attracting an inde-
pendent copyright. 26
An abridgement of an existing literary work will similarly have to be
assessed on a case by case basis. As stated by Lord Atkinson in MacMillan
and Co. v. Cooper:
mhe precise amount of the knowledge, labour, judgment or literary skill or taste
which the author of any book or other compilation must bestow upon its com-
position in order to acquire copyright in it within the meaning of the Copyright
Act of 1911 cannot be defined in precise terms. In every case it must depend
largely on the special facts of that case, and must in each case be very much a
question of degree.2
7
Conversely, translations of literary works from one language to another
are always considered to be the product of sufficient time, effort and skill.
Indeed, there is no need to inquire into the amount of effort involved in a
particular translation; it is accepted as a proposition of law that a translation
is an original literary work.
28
Engravings 29 are treated in like fashion, since "[t]he engraver, although
a copyist, produces the resemblance by means very different from those em-
ployed by the painter or draftsman from whom he copies;-means, which
require great labour and talent. '30 This creative process, involving as it does
the engraver's talent and labour, satisfies the "originality" requirement in the
Canadian Act. Even where the engraver has merely traced the pattern of an
existing drawing he still creates an original work independent of the under-
lying artistic work. But if the engraver should copy the dimensions of another
engraving in producing his engraving, arguably the requisite original labour
and talent is lacking and the second engraving will not be protected as an
artistic work.
26 Redwood Music Ltd., supra note 24, at 119. The "author" of a work is generally
the first owner of copyright in it (Canadian Act. s. 12), however, the term author
is not defined in the Canadian Act. In the context of derivative works, it is submitted
that the author is the person whose original contribution to the derivative work meets
the statutory criterion of originality; Pollock v. 4C. Williamson Ltd., [1923] V.L.R. 225,
29 Argus L.R. 133, 44 A.L.T. 161 (Vic. S. Ct.).
27 (1923), 40 T.L.R. 186 at 190, 93 L.J.P.C. 113 at 121, 130 L.T. 675 at 681
(P.C.). The judgment is quoted with approval in Stevenson v. Crook, [1938] Ex. C.R.
299 at 309-10, 4 D.L.R. 294 at 304, and Ascot Jockey Club Ltd., supra note 19 at 417
(W.W.R.), 57 (Fox Pat. C.), 128 (C.P.R.). Compilations are included within the
definition of a literary work. See s. 2 and the discussion in Goldsmith, Copyright
Protection for Compilations (1982), 15 P. & T.M. Inst. Can. 989.
28 Byrne v. Statist Company, [1914] 1 K.B. 622, 83 L.J.K.B. 625, 110 L.T. 510;
Zamacois v. Douville, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 257, 3 Fox Pat. C. 44, 2 C.P.R. 270 (Ex. Ct.).
See also Pollock, supra note 26.
29 Canadian Act, s. 2 "artistic work" and "engraving".
30 Neivton v. Cowie (1827), 130 E.R. 759 at 763, 4 Bing. 234 at 245, 12 Moore,
C.P. 457 (Common Pleas). See also Martin v. Polyplas Manufacturers Ltd., [1969]
N.Z.L.R. 1046 (S. Ct.).
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A photograph-an artistic work in its own right31 -of another artistic
work, such as a painting or a statue, is also a derivative work.32 But whether
the photograph is, in addition, an original artistic work can only be deter-
mined by asking what creative effort or skill the law is seeking to protect.
If it is the selection of the subject matter, the lighting and the angle of the
shot that is meant to be rewarded, then a second photographer following
in the footsteps of the first would not receive copyright in his photograph.
But, if the effort being rewarded is simply the technical process of producing
the photograph then the second photograph could still be an original work.
The fact that the Canadian Act deems the owner of the negative, rather than
the person who takes the photograph, to be the author of the artistic work
suggests that the statute is protecting primarily the technical skill associated
with photography rather than the artistic endeavor.33 It is likely, therefore,
that all photographs will be protected as original works save perhaps a photo-
graph replicating an existing photograph. Just as with engravings, it seems
that the effort and skill involved in transferring the underlying work into the
new medium will satisfy the statutory originality requirement.
Two final derivative works warrant mention; the motion picture adapta-
tion of a literary, dramatic or musical work and the sound recording of a
musical work. A cinematographic film is a dramatic work within the meaning
of the Canadian Act "where the arrangement or acting form or the combina-
tion of incidents represented give the work an original character; '3 4 that is,
the film itself is a dramatic work independent of the copyright, if any, in the
material filmed. Where this "original character" is lacking, the cinemato-
graphic production is still protected under subsection 3 (1) (e) as a series of
photographs.35
31 ' "Artistic work" includes works of painting, drawing, sculpture and artistic craft-
manship, and architectural works of art and engravings and photographs.' Canadian
Act, s. 2. See also s. 2 "photograph". The person who was the owner of the negative
at the time the negative was made is deemed, by s. 9, to be the author of the photo-
graph. Cf. note 26.
32 "All photographs are copies of some cbject such as a painting or a statue."
Graved Case (1869), L.R. 4 Q.B. 715 at 723, 39 L.J.Q.B. 31 at 35, 10 B. & S. 608, per
Blackburn J. But only when that object is itself a "work" will the photograph be a
derivative work.
3 3 Supra note 31. While it may not be relevant to the question of copyright in a
photograph whether the photographer personally arranged the subject matter, that factor
will be important in determining the nature of protection granted to the photograph
and whether a subsequent work infringes its copyright. Bauman v. Fussell, [1978] R.P.C.
485 (C.A.) (decision in 1953 held that derivative painting did not infringe copyright in
photograph).
34 Canadian Act, s. 2, "dramatic work". See Roy Export Co. Establishment v.
Gauthier (1973), 10 C.P.R. (2d) 11 (Fed. Ct.), where a cinematographic film was
protected as a dramatic work. See also Warner Bros.-Seven Arts Inc. v. CESM Ltd.
(1971), 65 C.P.R. 215 (Ex. Ct.).
35 Canadian Admiral Corp., supra note 19 at 401 (Ex. C.R.), 131-32 (Fox Pat. C.),
93-94 (C.P.R.). The position was the same tinder the Copyright Act, 1911, 1-2 Geo. 5,
c. 46, s. 35 (U.K.); See Nordisk Film Co. Ltd. v. Onda, [1922] Macg. Cop. Cas. 337.
Unfortunately the Canadian Act, as am. by S.C. 21 & 22 Geo. 5, c. 8, contains a pro-
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Under subsection 4(3) of the Canadian Act sound recordings, or me-
chanical contrivances by which sounds can be reproduced, attract their own
copyright, independent of the copyright in the compositions recorded, "in
like manner as if such contrivances were musical, literary or dramatic
works."2' 6 The Act does not place any express limitation on the kinds of
recordings that may receive protection. Arguably, however, the expression
"in like manner" refers not only to the scope of protection provided for
literary, dramatic or musical works but also to the conditions precedent for
protection of such works, hence there is an implicit statutory criterion of
originality for mechanical contrivances. But again, in order to determine what
will satisfy the originality requirement for this particular derivative work one
must first ascertain which creative effort the statute seeks to reward through
the grant of copyright.
[S]kill, both of a technical and of a musical kind is needed for the making of such
a record .... The arrangement of the recording instruments in the building where
the record is to be made, the building itself, the timing to fit the record, the pro-
duction of the artistic effect, and, perhaps above all, the person who plays the
instruments, not forgetting the conductor, combine together to make an artistic
record, which is very far from the mere production of a piece of music.
37
If it is the collective contributions of the various individuals mentioned in
this description that are to be protected by the grant of copyright in a sound
vision that confuses the issue. Section 3(1) (e) provides that copyright includes the
right
"in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, to reproduce,
adapt, and publicly present such work by cinematograph, provided that the author
gives such work an original character; and provided also that if such original
character is absent the cinematographic production shall be protected as a photo-
graph."
(emphasis added)
While the "original character" test contained in the definition of dramatic work relates
to the particular cinematographic production, the phrase in s. 3(1)(e) appears to
relate to the underlying work which would be nonsense because if the underlying work
lacked originality, it would not be protected at all, let alone not be granted a cine-
matographic reproduction right. The problem is that the concluding clause has no place
in s. 3(1) (e) at all and should have been included instead in that part of the definition
of dramatic work which deals with the protection of cinematographic films. If this were
done, the ambiguity would be resolved and the law would clearly be as stated in the
text above. For a discussion of this problem see Perry, Copyright in Motion Pictures
and Other Mechanical Contrivances (1972), 5 C.P.R. (2d) 256 at 276-83. A motion
picture, or at least the sound track of a motion picture, can also be protected as a
mechanical contrivance pursuant to s. 4(3) of the Canadian Act. See, infra text accom-
panying note 36 ff. See also Wellington Cinema v. Performing Right Society, [1937]
I.L.R. 472 (Bombay).
36 As a result of Bill S-9, An Act to Amend the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. 4 (2nd Supp.), s. 1, the copyright in a mechanical contrivance is limited to an
exclusive right of reproducing the contrivance or any substantial part thereof in any
material form. Section 4(4) (new) now makes it clear that copyright in respect of a
mechanical contrivance does not include a public performance right. See generally
Alleyn, The Phonographic Industry Deprived of Its Performing Right in Canada (1972),
6 C.P.R. (2d) 258 and Keon, A Performing Right for Sound Recordings: An Analysis
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980).
37 Gramophone Co. Ltd. v. Stephen Carwardine and Co., [1934] Ch. 450 at 455,
103 L.J. Ch. 248 at 249, 150 L.T. 396 at 399, per Maugham J.
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recording, then a recording of an earlier recording would be a mere copy and
thus lack originality. But any independently produced recording of an existing
work should be treated as an original work regardless of whether the work
recorded has fallen into the public domain. Canadian case law does not,
however, serve to bulwark this conclusion.
There is obiter dictum in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc.38 which suggests that copy-
right subsists in a mechanical contrivance only where the composition re-
corded is currently protected. Estey J. writing for the Court states: "Thus,
subs. (3) [of section 4] brings into being another copyright, that is in the
record itself, where a musical work in which copyright subsists under section
3 is recorded. 3 9 This qualification of the scope of subsection 4(3) did not
bear on the appeal in question. Nor does there appear to be any basis in the
statute or case law for so restricting the copyright in records. Moreover,
since copyright in a mechanical contrivance seems to be granted in order
to prevent the appropriation of the collective labour of the producer of the
contrivance, 40 and not to reward the intellectual activity of the author of
the recorded work, it follows that the existence of copyright in a mechanical
contrivance should not be dependent upon the copyright status of the under-
lying work. For these reasons it is suggested that this dictum should be treated
per incuriam.
This survey demonstrates that the present approach to derivative works
accords with the fundamental proposition that copyright law rewards creative
effort without assessing the quality or merit of the particular creation. In
general, where a derivative work has been produced in the same medium
as the underlying work, such as a musical arrangement or a literary abridge-
ment, it will be a question of degree whether sufficient time, energy, and
skill have brought into existence an original work. With a derivative work
produced in a different medium, such as a foreign translation, or a two-
dimensional reproduction of a three-dimensional artistic work, the effort
involved in transferring will, in itself, constitute sufficient independent con-
tribution to produce such an original work. Those "technological" works
which are specifically dealt with in the statute, such as photographs, sound
recordings or films, would fall into this latter category.
The case by case approach to originality reflects a sensible balancing of
the interests of the derivative creator and the general public. The imposition
38 [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, (1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 249, 45 C.P.R. (2d) 1.
39 Id. at 361* (S.C.R.), 251* (D.L.R.), 3* (C.P.R.). A contrary view of the
equivalent provision in the Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 3 (U.K.),
19(1) was adopted in Gramophone, supra note 37, at 457 (Ch.), 250 (L.J. Ch.), 399
(L.T.) per Maugham J.: "mhe copyright conferred by s. 19 is not confined to cases
where there subsists a copyright in the original work at the time when the record was
made, and I do not think there is anything in the rest of the section which would lead
to that restricted view." Also, see Fox, supra note 3 at 190 "A work that is in the
public domain may become the subject of this special copyright."
40Note that the person who was the owner of the original plate from which the
mechanical contrivance was derived is deemed, pursuant to s. 10, to be the "author"
of the contrivance. Cf. note 26.
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of more precise standards, given the considerable amount of case law on the
question may simply result in undue influence being given to one of these
interests in a particular fact situation. Certainty must here be sacrificed for
a needed degree of flexibility. And for this reason, with the exception of the
suggestion concerning Compo Co., no recommendation to change the law
in this regard is believed necessary.
41
III. INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT BY THE DERIVATIVE WORK
Once it is accepted that a derivative work can be an original, protected
work, it becomes necessary to determine the legal relationship between it and
the underlying work. More precisely, can the act of producing a derivative
work infringe the copyright in the underlying work; and if so, does the fact
of infringement affect the copyright status of the derivative work?
The exclusive rights of the copyright owner are set out in subsection
3 (1) where copyright is defined as "the sole right to produce or reproduce
the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, to
perform... the work or any substantial part thereof in public; [or] if the
work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof.
'42
Subsection 3 (1) of the statute elaborates upon this express grant by provid-
ing the copyright owner with the sole right to produce derivative works,
specifying translations, dramatizations, novelizations, phonograph records
and cinematographic films.43 Whenever one of the specified derivative works
41 Compare Keyes and Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of
the Law, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977) [Hereinafter Keyes
and Brunet] at 43: "[Since] a specific definition of "original" in any new Act might
lead to interpretative difficulties in view of existing voluminous case law, no recom-
mendation is made."
42This paper examines only those rights concerned with the making of physical
objects, which means primarily the reproduction right. There is no discussion of the
public performance right. Also, any discussion of the moral rights of the author has
been omitted. It should be noted however, that the Canadian Act does grant the author,
independently of the copyright in his work, an integrity right. See s. 12(7) (the right
"to restrain any distortion, mutilation or other modification of [his] work that would
be prejudicial to his honour or reputation"). Generally see, Colas, Le Droit Moral de
L'Artiste sur son Oeuvre (1981), 59 Can. B. Rev. 521. Cf. s. 26(2).
43 3 (1) For the purposes of this Act.... [copyright] includes the sole right
(a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the work;
(b) in the case of a dramatic work, to convert it into a novel or other
nondramatic work;
(c) in the case of a novel or other nondramatic work, or of an artistic
work, to convert it into a dramatic work, by way of performance in
public or otherwise;
(d) in the case of a literary, dramatic, or musical work, to make any record,
perforated roll, cinematograph film, or other contrivance by means of
which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered;
(e) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, to re-
produce, adapt and publicly present work by cinematograph, if the
author has given such work an original character; but if such original
character is absent the cinematographic production shall be protected as
a photograph;
and to authorize any such acts as aforesaid.
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is produced without the consent of the owner of the underlying copyright,
that act is deemed to be an infringement pursuant to subsection 17(1) and
the copyright owner may initiate proceedings to enforce his rights.
A number of the derivative works discussed earlier are not expressly
mentioned in section 3. The Canadian Act does not, for example, give the
owner of the copyright in a musical work the exclusive right to make new
arrangements of his composition. Other copyright statutes, such as the United
Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956, grant the owner of copyright in a literary,
dramatic or musical work an "adaptation" right that is defined to include,
in the case of a musical work, the right to arrange or transcribe any adapta-
tion of the work.44 This provision accords with the Rome Revision of the
Berne Convention45 which, in article 12, expressly provides that adaptations
and musical arrangements may be unlawful reproductions:
The following shall be specially included among the unlawful reproductions to
which the present Convention applies: Unauthorized indirect appropriations of a
literary or artistic work, such as adaptations, musical arrangements, transforma-
tions of a novel, tale, or piece of poetry, into a dramatic piece and vice versa,
etc., when they are only the reproduction of that work, in the same form or in
another form, without essential alterations, additions, or abridgements and do not
present the character of a new original work.
The substance of article 12 has been partially incorporated in the Cana-
dian Act. In the case of a right of dramatization, for instance, the combined
effect of subsection 3(1) (b) and subsection 17(1) renders an unauthorized
dramatization an act of infringement. 46 But in Canada the owner of copyright
in a musical work will be able to claim the exclusive right to produce an
adaptation or arrangement based on his original composition only where the
later work reproduces the original musical work or any substantial part of it
in a material form; that is, if the production of the arrangement or adaptation
is caught by the introductory part of subsection 3(1). A conclusion of this
nature was reached in Austin v. Columbia Graphophone Company Ltd.,47
44 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., c. 74, s. 2(5), (6) (U.K.).
45 [1931], Can. T.S. No. 3, 123 L.N.T.S. 233, [1932] G.B.T.S. 12.
46The Rome Revision of the Berne Convention does not contain a provision
prohibiting the reproduction of works protected by copyright. Not until the Stockholm
Revision (1967), art. 9, were authors of literary or artistic works stipulated to have
the exclusive right of authorizing reproduction in any manner or form. Nevertheless
it seems clear that the term "unlawful reproduction" in art. 12 of the Rome Revision
of the Berne Convention contemplates an infringing reproduction, that is, a reproduction
without consent. The reason why art. 12 adopted the approach of deeming certain
derivative works unlawful reproductions, rather than granting the underlying copyright
owner an exclusive right to produce those derivative works, as the Canadian Act does,
is offered in Briggs, The Law of International Copyright (London: Stevens & Haynes,
1906) at 389-90: "The fact, however, that at first sight the works in question present
the appearance of new and original works gives them at least a prima facie independ-
ence, and because of this prima facie independence they are more effectually prohibited
by an express designation of them as infringements than by an express extension of
the rights in the original work, involving merely by implication that they are to be
treated as illegal."
47 67 Sol. J. 790, [1917-23] Macg. Cop. Cas. 398 (Ch.D.). See also Chappell Co.
v. Columbia Graphophone Co. Ltd., [1914] 2 Ch. 745, 84 L.J. Ch. 173, 112 L.T. 63.
Presumably the latter decision prompted the enactment of s. 19(4) of the Canadian Act.
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a case decided under the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911. There, Astbury J.
found that the defendants had infringed the copyright in the plaintiff's musi-
cal work by composing an orchestral score and band parts in which sub-
stantial parts of the plaintiff's work had been reproduced. Infringement, in
the case of a musical arrangement, is not merely a question of note by note
comparison. 48 As with all other works, in determining whether there has been
"substantial reproduction", the courts assess those portions of the underlying
work that have been reproduced by the defendant in qualitative as well as
quantitative terms.
49
Similarly, although the Canadian Act does not expressly provide the
owner of the copyright in an artistic work with a general right to produce
derivative works based on it, the language in subsection 3 (1 )----"to reproduce
the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever '' Qis
wide enough to encompass such a right. In King Features Syndicate Inc. v.
O.M. Kleemann Ltd.,5 ' for example, the House of Lords held that the copy-
right in the cartoon strip "Popeye the Sailor" was infringed by the manufac-
ture and sale of objects in three dimensions-in that case, brooches, charms
and plastic dolls. The conclusion that a three-dimensional object can sub-
stantially reproduce a two-dimensional work means that, in effect, the owner
of the copyright in an artistic work will have the exclusive right to make
certain derivative works in different media based on his work.
It would be useful in a revision of Canadian copyright law to expressly
provide the copyright owner with the exclusive right to exploit the work in
the manner just discussed. It is difficult to understand why, for example,
48 D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835), 1 Y. & C. Ex. 288, 4 L.J. Ex. Eq. 21, 160 ER.
117; Canadian Performing Right Soc'y v. Canadian National Exhibition Ass'n, [1934]
4 D.L.R. 154, [1934] O.R. 610 (Ont. S. Ct.). But see Joy Music Ltd. v. Sunday Pic-
torial Newspapers (1920), Ltd., [1960] 2 Q.B. 60, [1960] 1 All E.R. 703, [1960] 2 W.L.R.
645.
49 See Ladbroke (Football) Ltd., supra note 20; Ravenscroft v. Herbert, [1980]
R.P.C. 193 (Ch. D.). A similar inquiry will be made in cases where the Canadian Act
expressly grants the owner of the copyright in the underlying work the right to produce
a derivative work. For example, in the case of a dramatization of a novel, not every
dramatization produced without consent will infringe the underlying copyright. That is,
even though the dramatization may, in a broad sense be described as based on the
original novel, if the derivative work lacks substantial similarity to the underlying work
it will not infringe the copyright in the novel. See Kelly v. Cinema Houses Ltd., [1932]
Macg. Cop. Cas. 362.
50 Although the phrase "substantial part" contained in the i Codt r paragraph
to s. 3 (1) is not duplicated later in the subsections of s. 3 (I-tliat enumerate the specific
rights of a copyright owner, it is to be ipplied-in-aU of the provisions granting rights
in relation to therork-spe Coreltli-v. Gray (1913), 30 T.L.R. 116 (C.A.), discussing
the equivalent provision of the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911, 1-2 Geo. 5, c. 46.
51 [1941] A.C. 417, [1941] 2 All E.R. 403, 110 L.J. Ch. 128. See also King Features
Syndicate Inc. v. Lechter, [1950] Ex. C.R. 297, 10 Fox Pat. C. 144, 12 C.P.R. 60. It
is implicit in the Canadian Act that a two-dimensional reproduction can infringe the
copyright in a three dimensional work since s. 17(2), the general exemption subsection,
provides at subsection (c) that in certain circumstances the making of drawings or
photographs of a work of sculpture or architectural work of art "dotes] not constitute
an act of infringement of copyright."
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the owner of the copyright in a novel is granted a right of dramatization
whereas the owner of copyright in a musical composition is not granted
an adaptation right. Both rights are contemplated under the Berne Conven-
tion. Decisions such as Austin v. Columbia Graphophone Ltd. illustrate that
the present law may nevertheless provide the copyright owner with an equiva-
lent right by means of the vehicle of substantial reproduction. In order to
conform to article 12, and in the interest of certainty, however, the future
Canadian statute should expressly include an exclusive adaptation right.6
2
And as far as artistic works are concerned, Keyes and Brunet have recom-
mended that the new copyright act expressly grant the right to reproduce a
two-dimensional work in three dimensions and vice versa. Such an approach
would simply codify the present common law position. Furthermore, it would
be consistent with the general philosophy of Canadian copyright law which
takes an expansive view of the scope of the creator's monopoly.
What then are the implications of rewarding creative effort by the grant
of such a wide range of rights of exploitation? First, to do so calls into
question a principle often cited as the cornerstone of the law of copyright:
"that there can be no copyright in an idea or concept"; 4 copyright protects
only the form in which the idea or concept is expressed. Yet many derivative
works by their very nature take on a different shape or form from that of
the underlying work. Therefore, if a copyright owner is given the exclusive
right to produce derivative works based on his underlying work, something
other than simply the form or expression of his creative efforts is being
protected. The treatment of derivative works and copyright infringement
clearly illustrates that the principle is not nearly as sacrosanct as the quoted
maxim would suggest.55
Second, as a practical matter, the author of a derivative work will have
to secure the consent of the underlying copyright owner in order to lawfully
create and exploit his work. Once he has obtained that consent, the Canadian
Act grants the derivative copyright owner, as any other copyright owner, the
sole right to do or authorize any of the acts described in subsection 3(1).
And while any such act done without the consent of the derivative copyright
owner is an infringement, that same act may also infringe the copyright in
the underlying work. Thus, a single act may give rise to two distinct infringe-
ment claims, at least in those cases where the derivative author has lawfully
52 Keyes and Brunet, supra note 41, at 51-53 make a similar recommendation.
531d. at 49-50. See the Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., c. 74, s. 48(1). (U.K.)
54 L.B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Productions, supra note 22 at 629 per Lord Hailsham
of Marleybone. See Case Comment, [1979] 1 E.I.P.R. 56 at 58. For similar statements
see Cartwright v. Wharton, [1912] 1 D.L.R. 392 at 393; 25 O.L.R. 357 at 358 (Ont. H.
Ct.); Deeks v. Wells, [1931] 4 D.L.R.-533 at 536, [1931] O.R. 818 at 834 (C.A.), aff'd
[1933] 1 D.L.R. 353 (P.C.); Moreau v. St. Vincent, [1950] Ex. C.R. 198 at 203, [1950]
3 D.L.R. 713 at 717; 10 Fox Pat. C. 194 at 198. Formules Municipales Ltee v. Pineault
(1975), 19 C.P.R. (2d) 139 (Fed. Ct.).
55 See Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1966) at 56-58. See also Note, Derivative Works and the Protection of Ideas
(1980), 14 Geo. L. Rev. 794.
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produced his work. But what of the other cases where the derivative author
acts without permission?
IV. THE INFRINGING DERIVATIVE WORK
A. Copyright In An Infringing Derivative Work
Is the derivative author who fails to obtain the requisite consent of the
underlying author denied copyright in his work? It is believed that this ques-
tion should receive a negative reply, but in order to explain why, two issues
must be considered. First, are infringement and originality mutually exclusive
concepts? And second, if not, is there a rule of Canadian copyright law
barring copyright in infringing derivative works?
If originality and infringement or, more precisely, reproduction, were
conceptually linked, the question, whether there is copyright in an infringing
derivative work, would be less likely to arise since a finding of infringement
would generally involve a finding of reproduction without consent, and that
finding of reproduction would itself negate originality. But originality and
infringement are not related in this manner. Indeed, the two questions address
different issues; infringement focuses on the plaintiff's work and asks whether
there has been a substantial interference with the plaintiff's rights by the
defendant; originality, at least in this context, looks to the defendant's work
and asks whether there has been enough creative effort involved to warrant
a grant of copyright. While a finding of one might mean an absence of the
other there is no logical reason why it must. If a defendant, for example,
makes a verbatim copy of the plaintiff's literary work without consent, he
infringes the latter's copyright and obtains no copyright in his copy. But the
reason he does not receive copyright is because there is insufficient skill,
labour and judgment included in producing a mere copy to warrant the grant
of monopoly. If, on the other hand, the defendant translates the plaintiff's
work without consent, he infringes copyright yet, at the same time, produces
an original work. Whether the translation should be protected is a separate
question, but as far as originality is concerned the translation would satisfy
the test.
There are some isolated references in judicial decisions and academic
writing which suggest, contrary to what is stated above, that the two concepts
of infringement and originality are directly related. Richardson's The Law of
Copyright, for example, states that a "work must be original but that seems
to mean no more than it must not itself infringe the copyright in a copyright
work."500 No explanation is offered for that view. Moreover, this treatise was
written soon after the enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911 and
56Richardson, The Law of Copyright (London: Jordan & Sons, 1913) at 182
(footnotes omitted). The author was speaking at that point about artistic works; he
expresses a similar view in relation to literary works (at 83). The same opinion is given
in Robertson, The Law of Copyright (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1912) at 29.
Compare Bain v. Henderson (1911), 16 B.C.R. 318, 17 W.LR. 125 (B.C.S.C.). Indeed,
there are those it seems who still today support this view, at least in relation to musical
works: McFarlane, Originality: A Question of Arrangement (1980), 130 N.L.J. 33 at 34.
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must therefore be treated with caution in light of more modem texts that
reflect a substantial body of case law.57
More problematic are recent decisions dealing with the converse ques-
tion, which indicate that the issue of infringement turns on whether the
alleged infringing object is an original work. One such case is the recent Joy
Music Ltd. v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd.58 which held that a
defendant, who through his own "mental labour" made sufficient alterations
to the plaintiff's musical lyrics to create an "original work", had not infringed
the plaintiff's copyright in the underlying work.59 The case must be viewed
however, in the context of the particular issue involved. The court, asked to
determine whether a parodied version of the lyrics of a song substantially
reproduced and therefore infringed the copyright in the original lyrics, ruled
that there was no infringement, applying a test framed, in practical terms, in
favour of the defendant. The explanation for the approach here and in other
cases involving parodies and satires is not that originality and infringement
are, from a conceptual standpoint, mutually exclusive but that the courts are
"unwilling to suppress this independent art form which is sometimes superior
to, and more lasting than, the original work. They would rather find that
parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom.... ."GO This test, which
clearly restricts the scope of the underlying author's monopoly, has not been
applied to other derivative works.61 One should not try, therefore, to extract
57 Skone James, Mummery, Rayner James, Copinger and Skone James onl Copy-
right (12th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980) at 54-58 [hereinafter Copinger and
Skone James on Copyright (12th ed.)].
58Supra note 48. Cf., e.g., Nat. Film Board v. Bier (1970), 63 C.P.R. 164 at 171
(Ex. Ct.) (respondent attempted to invert the issue, arguing that he could obtain
copyright in his own publication based on a number of original contributions, when
the issue was whether his publication infringed the copyright in the petitioner's publi-
cation).
59 Supra note 48 at 70-71 (Q.B.), 708 (All E.R.), 651 (W.L.R.). The court
applied the test formulated in Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co., [1916] 1 Ch. 261 at
268, 85 L.J. Ch. 261 at 264-65, 114 L.T. 354 at 356. ("no infringement of the plaintiffs'
rights take place where a defendant has bestowed such mental labour upon what he
has taken and has subjected it to such revision and alteration as to produce an original
result.") A Canadian decision concerning a song with parodied lyrics has also stated in
dictum that it would have applied the Joy Music Inc. test if the issue of copyright
infringement had arisen; see Ludlow Music Inc., supra note 11, at 123n (Ex. C.R.),
215 (D.L.R.), 297 (C.P.R.).
6ODworkin, The Moral Right and English Copyright Law (1981), 12 IIG 476
at 484. See also "Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright (1955),
33 Can. B. Rev. 1130 and Comment, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question
(1981), 57 Wash. L. Rev. 163.
61 The test, however, seems to accord with art. 12 of the Berne Convention which
provides that unauthorized arrangements or transformations are unlawful reproductions
"when they are only reproductions... without essential alterations, additions or abridg-
ments and do not present the character of a new original work" (emphasis added).
The Report of the Committee on the Law of Copyright [hereinafter Gorell Committee]
(Cd. 4976, 1909), at 22, expressed the opinion that the implication inherent in article
12 that an original work could not be an infringement was "not in accordance with
British law" and recommended that the implication should not be adopted. Article 12
was simply to be viewed as illustrative of unlawful productions. Generally, this recom-
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from a single line of cases a general authority for the reverse proposition:
namely, that infringement negates originality.
The further question, whether an "infringing" derivative work can ever
be the subject of copyright, is not addressed in the Canadian Act or in the
Rome Revision of the Berne Convention.62 And although two recent deci-
sions, one English and one Canadian, have addressed the problem, the matter
is still unclear since they come to different conclusions on the existence of
copyright in an infringing derivative work. As a result, the issue is largely
unresolved in Canada and the United Kingdom. 3
Equally persuasive arguments may be made to support either position in
terms of the object of the Canadian Act. The protectionist camp argues that
since an infringing derivative work involves as much creative effort as a
lawfully produced derivative work, and the statute seeks to reward creativity,
the former work warrants protection as much as the latter. Yet granting copy-
right to an infringing derivative work sanctions infringement and thus, to an
extent, encourages intrusion into the monopoly rights of the underlying own-
er. 4 A rule denying copyright, and hence the sole right to reap the benefits
of works produced in infringement of another's rights, discourages infringe-
mendation appears to have been followed in the copyright law of the United Kingdom.
Others have expressed dissatisfaction with the drafting of art. 12. See Ladas, supra
note 12, at 568: "It would be desirable that the words 'and without presenting the
character of a new, original work' be omitted from Article 12."
62 Article 6 of the Berne Convention of 1886 provided that "[1]awful translations
shall be protected as original works" (emphasis added). In the Berlin Revision of 1906,
art. 6 was incorporated into art. 2 which treated translations, adaptations and other
reproductions as original works but omitted the requirement that they be lawful
as did all subsequent revisions of the Convention.
63 See Compo Co., supra note 38, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada and
Redwood Music Co., supra note 24, rendered by Goff J. (Q.B. Div.). Fox, supra note 3,
does not even raise the issue, while Boncompain, Le Droit d'auteur au Canada (Ottawa:
Le cercle du livre de France, 1971) states: "Dans les pays anglo saxons de telles oeuvres
[traductions] compos6es en violation d'un droit de l'auteur, ne sont pas protdgdes". The
authority cited, M.A. Frangon, La proprkit littraire et artistique en Grande-Bretagne
et aux Etats Unis (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1955) at 37, does not support the conclusion.
The Gorell Committee, supra note 61, concluded that it was doubtful whether a deriva-
tive work produced without consent was protected under British law; to which the
majority recommended a statutory amendment to "empower even an unauthorized trans-
lator to protect his work from copyists" (at 10). No such provision was ever enacted.
See also Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (12th ed.) at 55. Conversely, in the
United States, the matter is clear. A derivative work can only be copyrighted with the
consent of the publisher of the underlying work. This was the position under the United
States Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 349, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, § 7. See, for example,
Wainwright & Co. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp. 418 F. Supp. 620, 194 U.S. Pat. Q.
328 (U.S. Dist. Ct. 1976). The Copyright Act of 1976 17 U.S.C., similarly provides,
in § 103(a), that derivative works are only protected where lawful use is made of
pre-existing material.
64 Compare the dissenting comments of W. Joynson-Hicks, a member of the Gorrell
Committee, supra note 61: "With regard to affording copyright in a piratical translator
or adapter ... I do not consider it desirable to now propose to give legal sanction to
what is in effect a theft of the results of the brain of the original composer or author"
(at 31), Accord, E. Trevor Ll. Williams (at 32).
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ment of the latter's exclusive rights and thereby strengthens the statutory
scheme aimed at protecting the creative activity of an author.
In order to ascertain which of these two positions should be followed
the practical implications of adopting one over the other must be weighed.
Begin with a hypothetical rule denying copyright to infringing derivative
works. Presumably knowledge of this rule will act as an incentive for the
derivative author to obtain the consent to produce his work. But what of
the derivative author who has taken all reasonable steps to identify and
locate the underlying owner but is unable to do so? Without consent he too
will infringe copyright in the underlying work and thus obtain no copyright
in his derivative work. An author faced with this dilemma, and knowing
that he will be denied any protection may -be discouraged from produc-
ing the derivative work. The rule would therefore conflict with the object
of the copyright statute to encourage creativity. Even where the derivative
could have obtained consent, but has not, the total denial of copyright is an
excessive price to be paid by the derivative author. Moreover the beneficiaries
of this rule would for no apparent reason, be the using public, not simply
the underlying owner. Over fifty years ago Mann J. made both of these points
in the rather pointed rhetorical question: "Why should copyists be per-
mitted to steal the fruits of the [derivative author]'s labours merely because
[the derivative author] cannot produce a licence from a stranger to the dis-
pute, who may be wholly indifferent as to his own rights".65
Were the derivative author to be granted copyright in an infringing
derivative work the underlying owner would not be prejudiced to the same
degree the derivative author would be were the opposite rule to be adopted.
Indeed, it is not clear that the underlying owner would be prejudiced at all.
He would still be able to claim relief against the derivative owner for in-
fringement. The Canadian Act provides a wide range of remedies including
injunctive restraint, damages and an accounting of profits. 0' The possibility
of uncertain, perhaps substantial liability in an infringement action creates
a strong incentive for the derivative author to seek the requisite consent even
without the additional sanction of a denial of any rights in the work. On
balance, therefore, it is believed that there should be copyright in an infring-
ing derivative work.
Of the two recent decisions to consider the problem only the English
case, Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co. 07 adopts this view. In that case
one of the arguments raised by the plaintiff was that copyright could not
65Pollock, supra note 26 at 233 (V.L.R.), 136 (Argus L.R.).
6
6See Canadian Act, ss. 17(1) and 20(1). Section 20(1) speaks of entitlement to
"all such remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts and otherwise, as are or may
be conferred by law for the infringement of a right." For a discussion of the civil
remedies available in an infringement action see Butler, Remedies and Enforcement
(Copyright Revision Studies, Research and International Affairs Branch, Bureau of
Corporate Affairs, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, forthcoming).
67 Supra note 24.
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subsist in a musical arrangement that infringes the copyright in the underly-
ing work. Gramophone Co. v. Steven Carwardine and Co.68 was cited as
authority for the proposition that there cannot be copyright in a mechanical
contrivance that is unlawfully produced. 9 Goff J. held in Redwood Music
Ltd., however, that the earlier decision proceeded on the assumption that
such was the case, without deciding the issue, and disregarded it as authority
for the proposition cited. Mr. Justice Goff then considered the matter as one
of first instance and refused to accept the argument. First, he noted that the
opportunity had arisen both in 1911 and in 1956 to insert the word "lawful"
into the statutory definitions found in the Acts of those years but on neither
occasion had it been seized. Second, the submission, if accepted, could lead to
"substantial injustice.... [T]he idea that [the owner of the underlying copy-
right] should be entitled to reap the benefit of another's original work, by
exploiting it, however extensive such work might be, however innocently it
might have been made, offends against justice and common sense."'70
The Canadian decision, Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc.,7 without
any analysis of the problem reaches the opposite conclusion, albeit in obiter
dictum,72 concerning the question whether a mechanical contrivance must be
produced with the consent of the owner of the copyright in the work recorded
in order to be protected. Estey J., writing for the Supreme Court of Canada
simply noted that:
Canusa... might, if authorized by the owner of the recorded musical work, be
the owner of the copyright in the record. However, the recording of the work
was not authorized .... No unauthorized exercise of the owner's mechanical rights
in a work can produce in the wrongdoer a copyright in the resultant record.1 3
This passage should not be viewed as embodying a rule of general appli-
cation for derivative works in Canadian copyright law. Even as a rule gov-
erning mechanical contrivances it is questionable. Subsection 4(3), which
creates copyright in mechanical contrivances "in like manner as if such con-
trivances were musical, literary or dramatic works," is silent on the matter
just as the remainder of the statute is in relation to other derivative works.
While it is true that Fox expresses a similar opinion on the question of
copyright in mechanical contrivances, nowhere is any justification for the rule
offered, other than a footnote reference to Gramophone Co. v. Stephen
Carwardine and Co.74 No one has attempted, therefore, to defend the rule
as a matter of principle.
68 Supra note 37.
69See Copyright Act, 1911, 1-2 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 19(1) (U.K.). Subsection 4(3)
of the Canadian Act follows almost verbatim s. 19(1).
7 0 Redwood Music Ltd., supra note 24 at 120.
71 Supra note 38.
72 As to the weight to be given to obiter dictum of the Supreme Court of Canada
see Sellars v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 527.
7 3 Supra note 38, at 374 (S.C.R.), 262 (D.L.R.), 14 (C.P.R.).
74 Fox, supra note 3, at 192. Fox also cites Wellington Cinema Co., supra note 35.
Hayhurst, Q.C., Compo Company Ltd. v. Blue Crest Music Inc. et. al. (1982), 31
U.N.B.L.J. 242 at 248 commenting on the point states: "This is a doubtful proposition."
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One could try to support the rule in Compo Co. on the basis of the
peculiar treatment of mechanical contrivances under Canadian copyright law.
Section 19 of the Canadian Act creates a compulsory licence that enables, in
certain circumstances, the production of mechanical contrivances of a record-
ing of a literary, dramatic or musical work without the actual consent of the
underlying author if proper notice is given and royalties paid.75 A similar
right to produce other kinds of derivative works is not to be found in the
Canadian Act. It could be argued, therefore, that the "special copyright"
in mechanical contrivances should be conditional upon compliance, when
required, with the section 19 requirements. Only if this argument is accepted
is the position adopted in Compo Co. justifiable. For all other infringing
derivative works, in the absence of similar special circumstances, copyright
should subsist therein.
B. Enforcement of Copyright in an Infringing Derivative Work
An argument may be advanced that the courts should not allow them-
selves to be used to protect an infringing derivative copyright owner's rights
against a would-be infringer.7" Such an argument does not deny the subsist-
ence of copyright in a derivative work, but rather suggests that a derivative
author's status as an infringer makes him unworthy of protection-ex turpi
causa non oritur actio. But if there is no enforcement there are no rights,
thus, to accede to this argument would be, in effect, to deny copyright in
infringing works, a proposition rejected in the preceding section.
A parallel could be introduced, however, between infringing works and
works that may be described as obscene, immoral, indecent, or irreligious.
Under the Canadian Copyright Act of 187577 "immoral, licentious, irreligious
or treasonable or seditious" works were expressly denied copyright. Yet un-
like the earlier statute, the Canadian Act purports to grant copyright in every
original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work irrespective of the char-
acter of the work. Fox nevertheless expresses the view, that "[g]enerally
speaking it may be said that ... the court will not intervene to protect such
a work from infringement. 78 However, all of the decisions cited by Fox in
75 Section 19 (1) of the Canadian Act provides that mechanical contrivances do not
infringe the copyright in a musical work if similar contrivances have previously been
made with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the copyright in the musical
work and the prescribed notice and payment of royalties have been rendered. See, e.g.,
Ludlow Music Inc., supra note 56. And generally, Noel, "Compulsory Licences and
Copyright," (1981), 12 R. Int'ale du D. D'Auteur 51.
70 Cf. Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., [1905-10] Macg Cop.
Cas. 16, 122 Fed. Rep. 922 (U.S.C.A. 1903); Cary v. Faden (1799), 5 Ves. 24, 31 E.R.
453 (L.C.); Slingsby v. Bradford Patent Truck and Trolley Company, [1905] W.N. 122
(Ch.D.).
77 38 Vic., c. 53, s. 4(3). See R.S.C. 1906, c. 70, s. 7. Cf. The Criminal Code
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 160. Provision is made in that section for the forfeiture of
publications found to be obscene within the meaning of the Criminal Code to Her
Majesty in right of the province.
78 Fox, supra note 3, at 49. Compare also the defence of illegal combine discussed
at 454-55, id.
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support of that opinion were decided under earlier legislation. Indeed, the
only case to consider the issue under the Canadian Act appears to support
the contrary position;79 and, given the implication that flows from the change
in the copyright statute there is good reason to doubt the correctness of Fox's
view.
Even if immoral and obscene works are to be denied protection any
analogy between those works and infringing derivative works should not be
accepted. There is nothing that a court could find morally offensive in an
infringing derivative work unless the derivative work has an immoral subject
matter. If the refusal to protect such works reflects a decision of the courts
to protect the public from the dissemination of offensive objects, then the
policy, and hence the rule, would have no application to infringing derivative
works.
Prima facie then, if anyone other than the owner of the copyright in an
infringing derivative work, or someone acting with his consent, does an act
restricted by subsection 3(1) of the Canadian Act in relation to the deriva-
tive work, that act will be one of infringement for which the copyright owner
can take action. The derivative copyright owner's suit could then be followed
by at least two other actions brought by the underlying copyright owner; one
against the infringing derivative copyright owner and one against his infringer.
What happens however, when the infringer of the infringing derivative
work is the underlying copyright owner? For instance, if the owner of the
copyright in a literary work managed to secure a copy of a translation of his
work that had been produced by another without his consent, could he then
exploit the translation without the translator's consent? According to the
analysis thus far, since the translator would have an independent copyright
and could lawfully enforce that copyright, the answer would seem to be no.
Arguably however, the Canadian Act furnishes the underlying owner with
a defence to infringement, for while the Canadian Act grants the trans-
lator the "sole right" to reproduce his work, it also gives the author, as first
owner of the copyright, the "sole right" to reproduce "any" translation of his
work. The latter owner could thus rely on the unequivocal grant of statutory
authority to do the act in question. Similarly, subsection 3(1) provides the
underlying copyright owner with the sole right to substantially reproduce his
work in any material form, ergo the same argument could be made in the
case of musical arrangements and various artistic derivative works. Accept-
ance of this argument would mean that the Canadian Act is granting the
underlying author the right to exploit the efforts of another with impunity,
a proposition which must be viewed with some scepticism given the object
of the statute. On the other hand, the Berne Convention does recognize some
potential restrictions on the rights of the derivative copyright owner by pro-
viding in article 2(2) that "translations, adaptations and arrangements are
to be protected as original works" but "without prejudice to the rights of the
author of the original work." The question is whether a right of free exploita-
79 Pasickniak v. Dojacek, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 545, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 865, 37 Man. R.
265 (C.A.).
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tion of certain derivative works is "a right of the author of the original work"
recognized by Canadian copyright law? Despite the language of section 3, it
is submitted that it is not.
When one examines the provisions governing derivative works other
than those just mentioned, it seems that section 3 simply grants the copyright
owner the right to create the derivative work; it does not expressly provide
a right to reproduce that work. Without that express provision the under-
lying copyright owner cannot make the same kind of argument that he can
in the case of a translation. Subsection 3 (1) (b) illustrates the point. Accord-
ing to that subsection the owner of the copyright in a dramatic work has the
sole right to convert it into a novel. If another were to write a novel based
on the drama he would acquire copyright in the novel. And further, if the
owner of copyright in the dramatic work reproduced that novel he would
infringe copyright and would not be able to raise any defence of statutory
authority. But if the underlying author were sued it goes without saying that
he would counterclaim against the novelist for infringement of his exclusive
right to convert the drama into a novel. More important, it should be under-
stood that even though the owner of the copyright is not expressly granted
the right to produce and "reproduce" any novel based on his drama, any
copying of the novel by the novelist or anyone else acting with or without his
consent will indirectly interfere with the right of the owner of the copyright
in the dramatic work to convert the drama into a novel and therefore will
infringe the latter's copyright. 80
The result then is the same for all derivative works; reproduction of the
derivative work without the consent of the underlying copyright owner in-
fringes the latter's copyright. If this is the case it would be wrong to interpret
section 3 in a fashion which, for no apparent reason, treats various works
differently. Moreover, even where the statute purports to expressly grant such
a right it does not explain how that right is to be reconciled with the same
right given to the owner of copyright in the derivative work. One is forced,
therefore, to reach a solution that most fairly balances the interests of the two
creators. To allow the underlying copyright owner to raise this defence re-
wards the creativity involved in the original work with a further statutory
right, yet, at the same time, the creative effort of the derivative author is
being appropriated without recompence. Conversely, to permit the derivative
copyright owner to assert his copyright against the owner of the underlying
work would allow both creative efforts to be recognized and rewarded, and
for this reason ig to be preferred.
In conclusion then, under Canadian copyright law the author of an
80 Grove Press, Inc. v. The Greenleaf Publishing Co. 247 F. Supp. 518, 147 U.S.
Pat. Q. 99, (N.Y. Dist. Ct., 1965) (copying an unauthorized translation infringes copy-
right in the underlying work). On the principle of "indirect infringement", see Hanfstaengl
v. Empire Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. 109, (1895) 11 T.L.R. 368, on appeal sub. nom
Hanfstaengl v. Raines & Co., [1895] A.C. 20; King Features Syndicate Inc. v. 0. & M.
Kleeman, supra note 51 and Melville, Indirect Copying-I, II (1981), 131 N.L.J. 1031,
1055.
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original yet infringing work should be granted copyright in his work and
should be able to enforce that copyright even against the underlying copyright
owner.
C. As an "Infringing Copy"
Since "infringing copies" of a work or a substantial part of a work in
which copyright subsists, and all plates used or intended to be used for their
production, are deemed to be the property of the owner of the copyright it is
important to ascertain whether copies of an infringing derivative work may be
infringing copies of the underlying work.8 1 If they may, it would mean that
the infringing derivative author, while granted an independent copyright in
his creation, would not own any of the physical copies of his work or even
the plates used to produce his work.
Section 21 is an exceptional provision enabling the copyright owner to
receive extraordinary civil relief. Irrespective of the perhaps substantial costs
incurred by the defendant in producing the infringing copy, the copy becomes,
free of expense, the copyright owner's property. Express provision is made to
permit the copyright owner to take proceedings for the recovery of possession
of the infringing copies or for their conversion. Courts however, have expres-
sed reluctance to make an order directing delivery under section 2 1 .s In
Netupsky v. Dominion Bridge Company,83 the British Columbia Court of
Appeal recently suggested that a court should refuse to make an order for
possession in circumstances where an order for specific delivery would be
refused in a detinue case. Failing an order for possession, the copyright owner
who can prove an act of conversion will be left to claim damages for con-
version.
Conversion damages in copyright cases may be excessive. They are
cumulative, not alternative, to damages awarded for the infringement of
copyright that produced the copies, but the remedies cannot be awarded so
81 Canadian Act, s. 21.
82 This parallels the approach taken in intellectual property cases to the common
law remedy of order up for destruction. See Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents,
Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1981) at 50. The
enactment of a provision comparable to s. 21 was held not to exclude the inherent
jurisdiction of the court to make an order for delivery up for destruction in copyright
cases. Warne & Co. v. Seebohm (1888), 39 Ch. 73, 57 L.J.Ch. 689, 58 LT. 928; Hole
v. Bradbury (1879), 12 Ch. D. 886, 48 L.J. Ch. 673 and Chappell & Co., supra note 47
at 755-56. (Ch.), 180 (L.J.Ch.), 66 (L.T.).
83 (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 182, 70 W.W.R. 241, 61 C.P.R. 150 (B.C.C.A.), rev'd
on other grounds, [1972] S.C.R. 368, 24 D.L.R. (3d) 484, 3 C.P.R. (2d) 1. (no special
value or interest to plaintiff, damages will fully compensate). Taggart, J.A. appears,
however, to be confusing the common law remedy of an order up for destruction with
that provided by s. 21. Note that the plaintiff's claim in Netupsky v. Dominion Bridge
Co., was for specific delivery. It is unclear whether a court would have the same dis-
cretion if the plaintiff framed his action in replevin under the Replevin Act, R.S.O. 1980,
c. 449. See Bentivogli v. W.P. Carey Securities Ltd. (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 447 concerning
the statutory right of action under the Replevin Act.
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as to yield a duplication of remedies. s4 The measure of damages in conversion
is usually the value of the goods converted at the date of conversion.85 Thus
damages are to be calculated on the basis of the total value of an "infringing
copy" and are not to be limited to the increment in value of the object
attributable to the creative effort of the author of the work. No allowance
is made for the value of the physical setting in which the work appears so if,
for example, an infringing copy were engraved in a silver chalice or a gold
medallion-examples recently cited by Lord Scarman in order to illustrate
the possible impact of applying a comparable provision of the United King-
dom Copyright Act, 1956 86-damages would be inordinately high.87 Keyes
and Brunet acknowledged the problem of excessive damages associated with
section 21 and, adopting the recommendations of the Isley Report,88 pro-
posed that section 21 be revised in order to distinguish between innocent and
guilty infringers.89 Under their alternative scheme a guilty infringer would
be liable either to deliver up infringing copies without compensation or to pay
damages if the infringing copies were retained. In the case of an innocent
infringer, however, the copyright owner would have the option of taking the
infringing copies at cost or leaving them with the infringer with a subsequent
accounting of profits. The Whitford Report has recommended that a similar
provision in the United Kingdom Copyright Act 1956 be abolished. 0 It is
difficult, therefore, to predict the fate of the deemed ownership provision in
any future legislation.
84 Sutherland Pub. Co. v. Caxton Pub. Co., [1936] Ch. 323 at 341-42, [1936] All
E.R. 177 at 185, 105 L.J. Ch. 150 at 155-56 (C.A.), affd [1939] A.C. 178 at 198, per
Porter L.J. (H.L.); Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd. v. Massie & Renwick Ltd., [1937]
Ex. C.R. 15 at 23; Netupsky, supra note 83; Pro Arts, Inc. v. Campus Crafts Holdings,
Ltd. (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 366 at 385, B.L.R. 1 at 24, 50 C.P.R. (2d) 230 at 249
(Ont. H.C.).
85 Pro Arts, Inc., id.
8G Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., c. 74, s. 18(1) (U.K.). Infabrics Ltd. v.
Jaytex Ltd., [1981] 2 W.L.R. 646 at 660, [1981] F.S.R. 261 at 277 (H.L.). Lord
Wilberforce expresses a similar view: "[I]n other imaginable instances very harsh results
might follow." [at 653 (W.L.R.), at 268 (F.S.R.)].
87 The recent case of W.H. Brine Co. v. Whitton (1981), 37 A.L.R. 190 (F. Ct. of
Aust.) illustrates this danger. The respondent imported into Australia a number of
soccer balls printed with an artistic work the copyright in which belonged to the appli-
cant. The soccer balls were thus "infringing copies" and the applicant was awarded
conversion damages based on the respondent's retail sales price less only a small amount
for delivery costs incurred after the time of conversion. In making the award Fox J.
stated his belief that the award involved "an unreasonably excessive amount if the aim
is simply to compensate the applicant for loss he suffered. However, even a cursory
examination of the history of copyright, and of the earlier Acts, discloses that there was
a penalty aspect in the remedies given." (at 200).
88 Can. Report on Copyright, (Isley Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957) at 85.
89 Supra note 41, at 192.
90 "The provision is anomalous.... The damages which may be awarded may be
out of all proportion to the injury suffered." Whitford Report, supra note 7 at 179,
para. 702. For a similar view see, Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Designs
and Performers' Protection (Cmnd. 8302, 1981) at 48, para. 3. The Whitford Report,
however, also recommended that courts should be given the discretionary power to order
delivery up of infringing copies as well as anything made for the purposes of producing
infringing copies, unless obliteration is possible.
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In the event that the new Canadian copyright statute retains section 21
in its present form or in some modified version, one matter that should be
considered is whether derivative works can be infringing copies of an under-
lying work. The Canadian Act presently defines "infringing", when applied
to a copy of a work in which copyright subsists, to mean "any copy, including
any colourable imitation, made, or imported in contravention of the provi-
sions of this Act.""' It is clear that the making of a derivative work may
infringe the copyright in the underlying work, but are copies of the former
work also "copies" of the latter? The term "copy" is not defined in the
statute,92 nor has the meaning of the term been addressed in any systematic
manner in Canada. As a result, the law is no clearer today than it was over
a century ago when Lord Bramwell asked, "what is a copy?
'93
In the context of derivative works the meaning of the term infringing
copy could lie anywhere between two extremes-it all turns on the meaning
given to the word copy. Either no original derivative works can be infringing
copies of the underlying work or all infringing derivative works are infringing
copies of it. To adopt the latter stance is to attribute no independent meaning
to the term copy in the expression infringing copy other than simply a physi-
cal embodiment of an act of infringement. Neither solution is satisfactory for
all classes of derivative works and what is proposed therefore, is an inter-
mediate test for "infringing copy", that is, a copy of a derivative work that
infringes the underlying copyright is an infringing copy of the latter work
where the copies are likely to compete in the market place with copies of the
underlying work. In practical terms, the proposed test restricts the possible
scope of the term infringing copy but still leaves room to include certain
derivative works within the definition.
A restrictive approach to section 21 may be supported on a number of
grounds. First, section 21 is an extraordinary provision. It is "confiscatory
in nature and must accordingly be strictly construed.194 Damages awarded
91 Canadian Act, s. 2, "infringing". There cannot be an infringing copy without an
act of infringement. Caxton Publishing Co., [1939] A.C. 178, supra note 84; Infabrics
Ltd., supra note 86; Roberts v. Jump Knitwear Ltd., [1981] 7 F.S.R. 527 (Ch. D.).
The fact that the definition of "infringing" copies includes copies "imported in contra-
vention" of the Act raises a number of difficult problems beyond the scope of this
paper. See Henderson, Canadian Copyright Law in the Context of American-Canadian
Relations (1977), 35 C.P.R. (2d) 67 at 80-81, Sharp, Import Restrictions in the Cana-
dian Copyright Act (1975), 17 C.P.R. (2d) 20, and Blomqvist and Lim, Copyright,
Competition and Canadian Culture: The Impact of Alternative Copyright Act Import
Provisions on the Book Publishing and Sound Recording Industries (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services Canada, 1981). Fox, supra note 4, at 492, takes the position
that s. 21 does not apply to copies of a work that have been imported, but only to
those produced in Canada.
92The term "copy" is used in the Canadian Act other than as part of the phrase
"infringing copy". For a discussion of whether "copy" carries the same meaning through-
out the Act see text accompanying note 109, infra.
93 Dicks v. Brooks (1880), 15 Ch. D. 22 at 33, 49 L.J.Ch. 812 at 818, 43 L.T. 71
at 74. So too, American courts have early wrestled with the question "what is meant by
a copy." See, infra, note 96 at 17 per Day J.
04 Canusa Records Inc. v. Blue Crest Music (1976), 30 C.P.R. (2d) 11 at 13 (Fed.
C.A.).
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under that section may far exceed compensation for the copyright owner's
loss and in this sense have a punitive aspect to them.95 Further, the punitive
feature is arbitrary since in calculating quantum there is no room to take into
account the particular circumstances of the infringement that produces the
copies. Traditional canons of construction dictate a strict interpretation of a
statutory provision such as section 21 which is penal in nature.
Second, the ordinary meaning of the word copy suggests some limitations
on the nature of an infringing object. This kind of interpretational analysis
prompted the United States' Supreme Court in White-Smith Music Pub. Co.
v. Apollo Co.,96 to find that a perforated roll for use in a player piano was
not a copy of a musical composition. The Court stated that to decide
otherwise would mean giving the word "a strained and artificial meaning.19 7
While both of those arguments in favour of a narrow interpretation of an
infringing copy could easily be overcome by expressly stating in the Act that
an infringing copy can include derivative works, one final submission raises
deeper problems, both practical and theoretical, in treating copies of deriva-
tive works as copies of the underlying work. First, if a third person repro-
duces a derivative work without consent, section 21 deems the copy to be
the, property of the derivative copyright owner. Where the copy is also an
infringing copy of the underlying work it is also deemed to be the property
of the underlying owner. Hence, section 21 deems two individuals to be the
owner of the same piece of property.
Moreover, to say that a copy of an infringing derivative work belongs
to the underlying owner contradicts the proposition advanced earlier; that
the underlying owner is not entitled to appropriate the efforts of the infring-
ing derivative author.98 An underlying owner who infringes the derivative
copyright should be liable in damages to the derivative owner, calculable in
terms of the value of the derivative author's contribution to the underlying
work. To allow the underlying author to claim through section 21 all copies
of the derivative work or their total value is to give to the underlying owner
something that he should not receive. The underlying owner has other reme-
dies available to him. He may permanently enjoin further production of
copies of the derivative work, as well as obtain damages for the loss suffered
as a result of the production of the copies. In most circumstances, such relief
should adequately reward the underlying owner for the creative effort in the
underlying work, without disregarding the principle that an original derivative
work merits its own pecuniary reward.
If, however, copies of the derivative work compete with copies of the
95 Supra note 86. Canadian courts do, in addition, award punitive damages for
copyright infringement even though there is no express statutory authority to do so.
See Zimmerman, Exemplary Damages and Copyright in Canada (1981), 57 C.P.R. (2d)
65.
96 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
97 Id. at 17. See also Tandy Corporation v. Personal Micro Computers Inc. 524 F.
Supp. 171 (Dist. Ct. Calif. 1981) ("R.O.M." ("Read Only Memory") silicon chips are"copies" of original computer programs imprinted on the chips).
98 Supra text following note 80.
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underlying work, to the extent that demand for the latter may be reduced
by the availability of the former, the underlying owner would suffer a poten-
tially greater loss than in those cases where the loss consists solely of the
opportunity to exploit the right to make derivative works. Indeed, the case
of potential competition is more analogous to that of a defendant dealing
in mere copies of the work to which section 21 clearly applies, than it is to
the case where no such competition can arise. Ensuring full protection of the
underlying author in these particular circumstances arguably warrants making
available the extended relief contained in section 21. This, in turn, can be
accomplished by adopting the proposed functional approach to the term
infringing copy.
Were "infringing copy" to be interpreted in this manner it is clear that
some derivative works would be caught. In other words, "infringing copy"
would not simply mean a "mere copy". That the present Canadian Act sup-
ports an extended view of the term is substantiated in two ways; first, an in-
fringing copy is defined to include, "colourable imitations" as well as copies
and, second, section 21 applies not only to copies of a work but also to
copies of a "substantial part" of it.
There is little direct support for this approach in the case law. Earlier
cases, decided before 1911, 9 often framed the question of infringement by
asking whether the defendant had produced a copy of the plaintiff's
work.'00 During that period there is authority for the proposition that a trans-
lation101 and a dramatization of a novel 12 were not infringements but that a
musical arrangement 03 and a photograph of an engraving were.10 4 Under
the present Canadian Act, all four acts done without consent would infringe
the underlying copyright, thus the case law is of limited use in addressing the
question of infringement. Nonetheless, the earlier approach does appear to
be consistent with the proposed test for an infringing copy. That is, if the
infringing copy test were applied to these four examples the results would
likely parallel those reached in the earlier cases. Indeed, one of the factors
expressly considered by earlier courts in determining whether a copy had
99 Before the enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911, 1-2 Geo. V., c. 46.
100 One court attempted to define "copy" for this purpose in the following terms:
"A copy is that which comes so near to the original as to give every person seeing it
the idea created by the original." West v. Francis (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 737 at 743, 106
E.R. 1361 at 1363 per Bayley J. (K.B.) and cited with approval, King Features Inc. v.
O.M. Kleenan Ltd., supra note 51 at 424 (A.C.), 406 (All E.R.), 130 (L.J. Ch.) per
Viscount Maugham; King Features Syndicate Inc. v. Lechter, supra note 51 at 305 (Ex.
C.R.), 152 (Fox Pat. C.), 69 (C.P.R.). This test as drafted simply reinforces the com-
ment made above questioning the accuracy of the oft-quoted principle that copyright
law does not protect ideas but only the particular expression of the idea. See text accom-
panying note 55, supra.
101 Macmillan & Co. v. Shamsul Ulamam Zaka (1895), 19 Indian L.R. 557 (Bom-
bay); Stowe v. Thomas 2 Amer. Law Reg. 210, 23 Fed. Cas. 201, (Circ. Ct. Pa. 1853).
102 Warne & Co., supra note 82; Toole v. Young (1874), L.R. 9 Q.B. 523, 43 ..
Q.B. 170, 30 L.T. 599; Reade v. Conquest (1861), 9 C.B. (N.S.) 755, 30 L.J.C.P.
209, 3 L.T. 888.
103 Wood, supra note 24.
104 Graves' Case, supra note 32.
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been produced was whether anybody would buy it instead of the protected
work. 0 5
There is only one modem Canadian case to consider the meaning of
"infringing copy": Canusa Records Inc. v. Blue Crest Music, Inc.100 The
issue was whether records, as mechanical contrivances, are infringing copies
of musical works. A musical work is defined in the Canadian Act to mean
"any combination of melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, re-
duced to writing, or otherwise graphically produced or reproduced."107 The
Federal Court of Appeal concluded that a copy of a musical work, for the
purposes of section 21, had to be a written or graphic reproduction of the
music. The result was reached without any reference to prior authorities. Fox
takes the opposite position, 108 based on an Australian judgment at first in-
stance: Albert v. S. Hoffnung & Co.,1' 9 although the Imperial Copyright Act,
1911, adopted in Australia by the Copyright Act (Federal) 191210 did not
define the term musical work, a fact not pointed out by Fox. Indeed, in a
prosecution under the statute"' from which the Canadian definition of musi-
cal work comes, it was held that a perforated roll for use in a player piano
was not a pirated copy of a musical work because a copy of a musical
work must be "either in print, or in writing, or in some graphic form.""12 So
in this sense the opinion adopted in Canusa Records Inc. is consistent with
earlier relevant authority." 3 More important still, the decision of the Federal
Court of Appeal supports the proposition that "infringing copy" is to be
given a strict interpretation. Not only is there an express statement to this
effect in the judgment," 4 but the result in the case also substantiates this
view. The requirement that a musical work must be graphically fixed does
not mean that a copy of a musical work must also be fixed in the same
graphic medium. However, the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal that
105 Dicks v. Brooks, supra note 93 at 35 (Ch.D.). Cf. Gambart v. Ball (1863) 14
C.B. (N.S.) 306, 143 E.R. 463, 32 L.J.C.P. 166. See also Glyn, supra note 59, 268
(Ch.), 264 (L.J.Ch.), 356 (L.T.).
'o6 Supra note 94.
107 Canadian Act, s. 2 "musical work".
'
0 8 Fox, supra note 3 at 388.
109 (1921), 22 S.R. (N.S.W.) 75 at 82, 39 N.S.W.W.N. 5 at 8 (S.Ct.). See also
Austin, supra note 47, R. v. Brooks and D.K.K. Enterprises Ltd., [1976] W.W.D. 66,
(1976), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 77 (B.C.Co.Ct.) and S.D.R.M. v. Trans World Record Corp.,
[1977] 2 F.C. 602, 17 N.R. 162, 39 C.P.R. (2d) 66 (Fed. C.A.), Chappell Music Ltd.
v. GRT Canada Ltd. (1979), 45 C.P.R. (2d) 145 (Fed.Ct.T.D.).
110 No. 20 of 1912.
M' Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act, 1902 2 Edw. 7 c. 15, s. 3
(U.K.).
1 2 Mabe v. Connor, [1909] 1 K.B. 515 at 529, 25 T.L.R. 217 at 218, 78 L.J.K.B.
342 at 345.
113 Compare the later obiter dictum of Estey J. in Compo Co., supra note 38, 375
(S.C.R.), 263 (D.L.R.), 15 (C.P.R.) (The record "presser is not creating a 'copy' of
the existing copyrighted work as does the printer, but rather the presser creates a new
work in which a new and separate copyright resides independent of the copyright in tho
recorded musical work.").
114 "[Section] 21 is 'confiscatory' in nature and must, accordingly, be read strictly."
Canusa Records Inc., supra note 94, at 14 (C.P.R.) per Jackett C.J.
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it must, implicitly approves a restrictive approach to the definition of an in-
fringing copy and thus, in part, supports the proposed test.
Applying that test will be highly problematic. Given a relatively uni-
lingual market, a translation is unlikely to reduce the demand for the original
work and would not, therefore, be an infringing copy. The same would be
true of a dramatization of a novel, or a novelization of a drama. For the sake
of certainty it would be useful for any statutory definition to include specific
illustrations."5l
One case that warrants special consideration is that of a sound recording
of a musical work. It is unlikely that the availability of sound recordings
would reduce the demand for copies of sheet music; indeed, the widespread
circulation of recordings of a work may increase its popularity and accord-
ingly the demand for sheet music. But to apply the proposed derivative work
test for infringing copies to phonograph records or other mechanical contri-
vances confuses the dual nature of sound recordings or, at least, perpetuates
the confusion generated by an antiquated definition of a musical work. There
have already been proposals to abandon the present definition of a musical
work which is drafted in terms of graphic fixation, 116 in favour of one that
includes a more liberal fixation requirement. 117 The adoption of such a defini-
tion would acknowledge that in one sense a sound recording is not a deriva-
tive work at all, but rather a primary work, or more accurately, a medium for
fixation of the original musical work. The single act of recording an original
musical composition, which prior to that time has not been fixed in a material
form, would of itself create two works in which there would be copyright;
one work being the underlying work, the other, the derivative work. If a
sound recording is viewed as a mode of fixation for the underlying work
and not a derivative work, then technically the proposed test for an infring-
ing copy is irrelevant. A sound recording of a musical work would therefore
be a "mere copy" of the musical work and since a mere copy would unques-
tionably fall within the definition of an infringing copy, an unauthorized
recording would be an infringing copy of the musical work. But simply re-
defining a musical work may not be sufficient. If section 21 is retained in
115 Compare Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., c. 74. Subsection 18(3) defines
"infringing copy" in terms of "reproduction". Subsection 48(1) provides that "reproduc-
tion in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work includes a reproduction in the
form of a record or a cinematographic film, and, in the case of an artistic work, includes
a version produced by converting the work into a three-dimensional form, or, if it is in
three dimensions, by converting it into a two-dimensional form". Subsection 18(3)
excludes from the definition of "infringing copy" reproductions of a literary, dramatic
or musical work in the form of a cinematographic film. The s. 18(3) exclusion has been
described by the Government as "anomalous" and deletion has been proposed. Reform
of the Law Relating to Copyright Designs and Performers' Protection, supra note 90 at
49, para. 6.
116 "The sheet music would be the work", Warner Bros.-Seven Arts Inc. v. CESM-
TV Ltd. (1971), 65 C.P.R. 215 at 243 per Cattanach J. (Ex. Ct.) following C.A.P.A.C.
v. C.T.V. Television Network Ltd., [1968] S.C.R. 676, 68 D.L.R. (2d) 98, 55 C.P.R. 132.
117 Keyes and Brunet, supra note 41, at 41. For a similar recommendation see
Berthiaume and Keon, The Mechanical Reproduction of Musical Works in Canada
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980).
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the new copyright act, any definition of an infringing copy, based on the
proposed test, should expressly include a sound recording of a musical work
in order to remove any doubt that may persist as a result of Canusa Records
Inc.
The sum of all preceding discussion, conclusions and recommendations
concerning the meaning of "copy" relates to one particular issue-whether
an object is an infringing copy for the purposes of section 21.118 Since the
practical implications, insofar as section 21 is concerned, of treating an object
as a copy play a primary role in the proposed definition of a copy, it should
not be applied to the term as it appears elsewhere in the Canadian Act, at
least, not until a similar analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and
competing interests involved has been made. The term copy, for example,
is also used in the definition of publication.
V. PUBLICATION THROUGH THE DERIVATIVE WORK
Under the Canadian Act "publication" means "the issue of copies of
the work to the public." 19 It is further provided that for purposes other
than those relating to infringement, "a work shall not be deemed to be
published... if published... without the consent or acquiescence of the
author ... .-"12o Whether an authorized issuance of copies of a derivative work
can publish the underlying work turns therefore, on the meaning of "copy"
in subsection 3(2) of the Canadian Act. But it will not suffice to simply
examine subsection 3(2) and related statutory provisions and case law; one
must first understand the significance of a finding of publication under Cana-
dian copyright law.1 2
1
118Compare s. 25 of the Canadian Act. Section 25(1) makes it an offence to
knowingly sell, import or distribute for sale "infringing copies" of a work. Where a
defendant is prosecuted under that section, the court before whom the proceedings are
taken may pursuant to s. 25(3) order that all infringing copies be destroyed or delivered
up to the owner or otherwise dealt with as the court may think fit. See also s. 25(2).
Note however that s. 25, unlike s. 21, deals only with infringing copies of a "work"
not with infringing copies of a substantial part of a work. See Brooks and D.K.K.
Enterprises Ltd., supra note 109.
119 S. 3 (2). Note that publication "does not include the performance in public of
a dramatic or musical work...."
120 Canadian Act, s. 3(3). Both the Rome and the Berlin Revisions of the Berne
Convention are silent on the question whether publication must be with consent. The
Revision, the Berne Convention in Stockholm in 1967, expressly adopted the position
presently reflected in 3(3) of the Canadian Act. See art. 3(3) of the Stockholm Text.
121 Infabrics Ltd., supra note 86 at 651 (W.L.R.), 267 (F.S.R.) per Lord Wilber-
force: "All through the history of copyright, under the common law, and through the
legislation over 280 years, there has been the well known contrast between unpublished
works and published works. The distinction lies at the roots of the law." Prior to the
enactment of the Canadian Act publication operated to divest common law copyright.
Pursuant to s. 4, statutory copyright now attaches to both published and unpublished
works. See also Canadian Act, s. 45:
No person is entitled to copyright or any similar right in any literary, dramatic,
musical or artistic work otherwise than under and in accordance with this Act,
or of any other statutory enactment for the time being in force, but nothing in
this section shall be construed as abrogating any right or jurisdiction to restrain a
breach of trust or confidence.
[VOL. 20, No. 2
Derivative Works
At least three principal issues of copyright law involve the question of
publication: term of copyright, eligibility for protection and defence of fair
dealing. While the term of copyright is generally life of the author plus fifty
years, literary, dramatic and musical works that are posthumous are pro-
tected for fifty years from the date of first publication.1 22 Thus, copyright
protection is perpetual as long as a work remains unpublished. Place of first
publication, along with residence or citizenship of the author, provide the two
qualifying conditions for copyright under the Canadian Act.128 If a work is
first published outside any country adhering to one of the international con-
ventions to which Canada adheres then it will not meet the first mentioned
condition for eligibility. It is unclear, given the present case law, whether
both conditions must be met or whether it is sufficient if one of the qualifying
factors is present. 2 4 Finally, Canadian copyright law recognizes a defence
of fair dealing "for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review
or newspaper summary."'125 Whether any particular use of the work is "fair"
is a question of fact to be decided in each case but some courts have taken
the position that no unauthorized use of an unpublished work can ever be
fair.126 In conclusion, then, a finding of publication will generally operate
to limit or restrict the rights of copyright owners, for once the copyright
owner chooses to commercially exploit his work there are certain limitations
placed upon the protection granted by the law.
The consent of the copyright owner to the exploitation of his work is
therefore crucial to publication. In the case of an issuance of copies of the
derivative work it might then be argued that since the consent of the under-
lying owner only relates to copies of the derivative work, the underlying
owner has not, by consenting to exploitation of the derivative work, con-
sented to publication of the underlying work, and therefore his rights in that
work should not be affected by his actions. This argument is fallacious, how-
ever, for the underlying owner does exploit his work indirectly by allowing
the issue of copies of the derivative work as he will generally receive remu-
neration from the publication of the derivative work. The question thus be-
comes: are the indirect benefits received from selling copies of the derivative
122 Canadian Act, ss. 5-7. The term of copyright for some derivative works such
as photographs and mechanical contrivances is a fixed term (i.e., fifty years). See notes
31 and 40, supra.
123 Canadian Act, s. 4(1).
124 According to art. 6 of the Berne Convention, first publication in a qualified
territory is an alternative basis for Convention copyright protection. Fox, supra note 3,
at 62-63 claims that under Canadian law the requirements are cumulative. This is the
position adopted in Ludlow Music Inc., supra note 11 (application for an interlocutory
injunction) as a result of looking to art. 4 of the Berne Convention in order to resolve
an ambiguity in the Canadian Act, s. 4. But the Court's attention does not appear to
have been drawn to art. 6, according to which first publication in a qualified territory
is an alternative basis for Convention copyright protection. See Hayhurst, Q.C., Industrial
Property (1979), 11 Ottawa L. Rev. 391 at 481-82. Keyes and Brunet recommend
that the act be revised to ensure an interpretation which meets Canada's international
commitments, supra note 41, at 44.
125 Canadian Act, s. 17(2) (d).
126 Zamacois, supra note 28.
1982]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
work and attributable to the underlying work sufficient to trigger the legal
consequences of a finding of publication? If they are, then the word copy
should be interpreted to exclude such derivative works.
The Canadian Act does not provide any specific guidance on this ques-
tion. 27 It is arguable, nonetheless, that it does contemplate the possibility of a
derivative work effecting publication of the underlying work; subsection 3 (2)
expressly provides that "the issue of photographs and engravings of works of
sculpture and architectural works of art shall not be deemed to be publica-
tion of such works.' 128 If a derivative work could never effectively publish
the original work then this provision would be unnecessary, although the
implication may simply be that photographs and engravings are copies
of the underlying artistic work and that other derivative works are not. Thus,
any inference in this regard to be drawn from subsection 3 (2) is equivocal
at best. Of more importance is the fact that subsection 3 (2) only speaks of
copies of "the work" and not copies of "a substantial part of the work". The
absence of this latter phrase lends support to a restrictive approach to the
term copy.129 The one Commonwealth case to address the issue, John Fairfax
& Sons Pty Ltd. v. Australian Consolidated Press Ltd.,"30 also adopts a
narrow view of the term copy. The court in that case expressly contrasted
the meaning of copy for the purpose of publication with its meaning in the
term infringing copy. In its former context, a copy is something that is a
literal transcription of the original work.' 3' No explanation however, was
offered by the court for its decision.
If forced to reach a conclusion based solely on the statutory definition
of publication and the existing caselaw one would likely decide that copies
of a derivative work cannot publish the underlying work. But when one also
considers the role that publication plays in Canadian copyright law the matter
is less certain. Why, for example, should an underlying copyright owner (or
more precisely his heirs) be allowed to receive remuneration through the
publication of derivative works, without having the clock begin to run on
the term of copyright in the underlying work? When the Canadian Act is
1
2 7 Nor do the International Conventions. Article 4(4) of the Berne Convention
provides that "published works" for the purposes of the Convention means, "works
copies of which have been issued to the public," with the word "copies" there, as under
the Canadian Act, undefined. Article 6 of the Universal Copyright Convention, Geneva
Text, defines publication as "the reproduction in tangible form and the general distribu-
tion to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read or otherwise visually
perceived."
128 See MacGillivray, The Copyright Act, 1911, Annotated (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1912) at 23. (exclusion of these two types of derivative works is viewed as "ex-
tremely arbitrary and artificial", and it is "a little unfortunate that this modification [was]
introduced".)
129Lahore, Intellectual Property Law in Australia-Copyright (Sydney: Butter-
worths, 1977) notes a similar distinction in the equivalent provisions in the Australian
Copyright Act, 1968-76 and concludes that "ilt seems to follow that a reproduction for
the purposes of publication implies an exact copy." (at 112)
130 (1960), 60 S.R. (N.S.W.) 413, 77 W.N. 68 S. Ct. F.C.).
131 Id. at 416 (S.R.), 70 (W.N.). The court was referring to a comparable provision
in the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911, 1-2 Geo. 5, c. 46.
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revised a similar question should be asked in relation to each of the various
issues that turn on a finding of publication under that statute and after
considering the collective answers express provision should be made in the
new Act governing publication of the underlying work through the issuance
of copies of derivative works.
VI. WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT AND ITS EFFECT ON
DERIVATIVE WORKS
One final matter to be addressed is the effect of a withdrawal of
consent by the owner of copyright in the underlying work upon derivative
works produced prior to its withdrawal. This section will interrogate two
issues; first, how does Canadian copyright deal with this problem at present,
and second, is this approach the proper one?
Under Canadian copyright law consent 132 to reproduce and further ex-
ploit a copyrighted work may be given in the form of a licence or an assign-
ment. A bare licence,13 3 which may be granted orally or implied from
conduct, 13 4 is nothing more than a permission that renders acts which would
otherwise infringe copyright, non-infringing. 13 5 An assignment, on the other
hand, must be in writing as it operates as a conveyance to the assignee of
certain, or all of the exclusive rights that make up copyright. 136 As provided
in subsection 12(4), an assignment can be for the whole term of copyright
or any part thereof.
Consent may, however, be withdrawn. In the case of a licence this may
occur pursuant to a term of the licence or through revocation of the licence
by the copyright owner.137 Although the revocation of a licence by the holder
of the copyright may be a breach of contract, the licensee's permission to
132 Subsection 17 (1) defines infringement in terms of doing a restricted act "without
the consent of the owner of the copyright". But the term consent is being used in a
narrower sense in s. 17(1) than in the text above. An assignment is not a consent given
by the owner of copyright, but rather operates as a conveyance of copyright so that
the assignee becomes the owner. While an assignee cannot infringe copyright, it is not
because of "a grant of consent from the owner" but because he is the owner. For our
purposes however, the term consent will be used to include an assignment of copyright.
'
3 3 The Canadian Act, s. 12(4), also speaks to "the grant [of] any interest in the
right by licence". The statute thereby seems to contemplate that some licences may grant
a proprietary interest in the copyright. See Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd., [1915] 1 K.B.
1, [1914-15] All E.R. 836, 83 L.J.K.B. 1837 (C.A.). The difference between a grant of
an interest by licence and a partial assignment is discussed in Torno, Ownership of
Copyright in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada 1981) at 80-89.
124 Canadian Act, s. 12(4) (A grant of an interest by licence must also be in
writing).
135 Canadian Act, s. 17(1).
136 Canadian Act, s. 12(4).
137 See, e.g., Chappell Music Ltd., supra note 109 where the plaintiffs, the owners
of the copyright in certain musical works, revoked all licences granted to the defendant
upon default by the defendant, and claimed all records and tapes manufactured there-
after as "infringing copies". See also Chappell Music Ltd. v. GRT of Canada Ltd.
(1980), 53 C.P.R. (2d) 196 (Fed. Ct. T.D.) (application to settle the formal order).
As to whether tapes and records are "infringing copies" of musical works, see, supra
text accompanying note 105ff.
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reproduce is gone once the licence is revoked. 138 Conversely, an assignment
cannot be revoked, yet there may be a reversion of copyright pursuant to its
terms or by operation of law. 139 Thus, the derivative author who has obtained
the requisite consent may nevertheless face the possibility of a revocation of
his licence or a reversion of the underlying copyright.
In order to examine the consequences of either occurrence, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between copies produced prior to cancellation of consent
and copies produced afterward. No commercial distribution of existing, law-
fully produced copies of a derivative work after the cancellation of consent
should result in copyright liability. Copies produced with consent clearly do
not infringe the copyright in the underlying work.140 Nor are such copies of
the derivative work infringing copies. Even though the term infringing copy
is wide enough to include derivative works, 141 an infringing copy must be
"made or imported in contravention of the Act."'' 4 (emphasis added) Final-
ly, the sale or distribution for the purposes of trade, of such copies should
not be caught by subsection 17(4) defining secondary or indirect infringe-
ment. The subsection provides that any person infringes copyright who, inter
alia, "sells or lets for hire or by way of trade exposes or offers for sale or
hire.. . any work that to his knowledge infringes copyright or would infringe
copyright if it had been made in Canada" (emphasis added). There is a
problem with the present drafting of subsection 17(4) since technically a
work cannot infringe copyright; rather, a person doing an act without consent
infringes copyright. To speak in terms of a work that infringes copyright
leaves unanswered the question at what point is consent relevant, and thus,
leaves unresolved the issue whether a derivative work produced with consent
infringes copyright in the underlying work once consent is withdrawn.148
The problem only arises, however, on an excessively literal reading of sub-
138 Hart v. Hayman, Christy, and Lilly Ltd., [1911-16] Macg. Cop. Cas. 301 (Ch.
Div.). Some licences may be irrevocable. See Silverson v. Neon Products Ltd., supra
note 19 and British Actors Film Co. v. Glover, [1918] 1 K.B. 299, 87 L.J.K.B. 689, 118
L.T. 626. It is not clear whether an assignment of copyright operates to terminate all
licences previously granted by the assignor. Cf. Tito v. Waddell (No. 2); Tito v. A.G.,
[1977] 3 All E.R. 129, [1977] Ch. 106, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 496 (common law principle
that with the benefit goes the burden). The Isley Report, supra note 88, at 115, re-
commended that the Canadian statute should be amended to make a licence binding
on every successor in title to the owner of copyright, even a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice. See id. 115 and United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5
Eliz., c. 74, s. 36.
139 Canadian Act, s. 12(5). See text accompanying note 151, infra.
140 Canadian Act, s. 17(1). See Howitt v. Hall, [1862] 6 L.T. 348, 26 J.P. 372, 10
W.R. 381; Taylor v. Pillow (1869), L.R. 7 Eq. 418; Warne v. Routledge (1874), L.R.
18 Eq. 497, 43 L.J. Ch. 604, 30 L.T. 857.
14 1 See text accompanying ote 97, et seq., supra.
142 See text accompanying note 91, et seq., stpra.
143 See Monckton v. Pathd Fr~res Pathephone Ltd., [1914] 1 K.B. 395, 83 L.J.K.B.
1234, 109 L.T. 881 (C.A.). The United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., c.
74, s. 5(2), now expressly stipulates that a claim of secondary infringement can arise
only where the defendant is dealing in articles "the making of which" constituted an
infringement of copyright. For a recommendation that a similar approach be adopted
here see Isley Report, supra note 88 at 51-52.
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section 17(4). There is no reason to believe that Parliament intended to cast
a wider net for secondary infringement than it has for piracy. Indeed, the
requirement of proof of knowledge for infringement in the former category
suggests the contrary proposition is more likely. 144 Further, any possible
ambiguity in subsection 17(4), appears to be clarified by the final clause of
the subsection: "or would infringe copyright if made in Canada." The deri-
vative owner, or anyone else, should therefore be free to dispose of any
copies of his work still on hand.145 Only if the underlying owner has addi-
tional rights stipulated by contract would he be entitled to relief in such
circumstances.
146
The underlying copyright owner may, on the other hand, bring an in-
fringement action in relation to each and every copy of the derivative work
produced after consent is withdrawn. The derivative owner who continues
to exploit his work can hope that the underlying owner does not intervene
and enforce his rights, but if he does, not only can the underlying owner
claim damages for infringement and, in some circumstances, conversion
damages,'147 he may, in addition, be able to enjoin the further exploitation,
without consent, of the derivative work by the derivative owner or his
licensees.
48
The possibilities of the derivative author successfully raising a defence
to infringement are limited. He may perhaps seek to establish that the under-
lying owner has impliedly licensed him to continue to exploit his derivative
work.149 There is nothing unique to the subject of derivative works in this
144 Canadian Act, s. 17(4). See Clarke, Irwin & Co. v. C. Cole & Co. (1960), 22
D.L.R. (2d) 183, [1960] O.R. 117, 33 C.P.R. 173 (Ont. H.C.). Primary infringement
is established without proof that the defendant knowingly infringed copyright.
145 There is a possible exception. If the underlying work were previously unpub-
lished, an infringement action could result from the sale of lawfully produced copies of
a derivative work. Section 3(1) grants the sole right "if the work is unpublished, to pub-
lish the work or any substantial part thereof'. So if the underlying work is "unpublished"
and the copies of the derivative work are copies of the underlying work the issue of the
copies to the public will infringe the underlying copyright. See text accompanying note
119, supra. However the consent to produce the copies of the derivative work may carry
with it implied consent to dispose of the copies, in which case the publication will not
be an infringement of the underlying copyright.
146 A licensee in anticipation of the termination of his licence may produce and
warehouse large quantities of copies of the work for distribution after the completion
of the licence term. The licensor may want to stipulate against such a possibility in the
licence agreement.
147 In cases where the copy of the derivative work is an "infringing copy" of the
underlying work. See text accompanying note 97, supra.
148 Gramophone Co., supra note 37 at 459 (Ch.), 251 (L.J. Ch.), 399 (L.T.) per
Maugham J., "[tlhe rights of the adapter are subordinate to the rights of the composer,
who is entitled to an injunction to restrain the performance [in public] of the new
arrangement of his musical work so long as his copyright is still subsisting."
149 Cf. Pigeon (formerly Pigeon J. of the Supreme Court of Canada) Book Review
of Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (12 ed.) in (1981), 13 Ott. L.Rev. 438
at 440 commenting on the decision in Solar Thomson Engineering Co. v. Barton, [1977]
R.P.C. 537 (Ch.D.), aff'd [1977] R.P.C. 550 (C.A.). (The Court's finding of an implied
licence "illustrates a great virtue of the common law: an ability to develop doctrines
whereby inequitable results are avoided.")
1982]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
proposition. A finding of an implied licence is simply a question of fact. But
the availability of this defence will vary according to the nature of the original
consent and the manner in which it was cancelled. In the case of an express
licence for a fixed term which has expired, or a licence which has been ex-
pressly revoked, it would be artificial, regardless of the circumstances, to find
implied consent.
Where permission has been revoked through reversion of copyright by
operation of law there is a greater chance that a court will find an implied
licence. 150 According to subsection 12(5), where copyright has been assigned
by an author otherwise than by will, any copyright interest of the assignee
will revert to the author's legal representative twenty-five years after the
author's death. A recent illustration of a finding of a post-reversion licence
pursuant to the British equivalent of subsection 12(5) is the case of Redwood
Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co.151 There, Goff J. held that the publishers, as
former assignees of the copyright in certain works who continued to remit
royalties, were impliedly licensed to continue doing acts authorized by the
original assignment until they received express notice of revocation. But as
this case indicates it is always open to the reversionary beneficiary to revoke
the implied license. So the implied licence, even if it can be supported by the
facts, offers little meaningful protection for the derivative owner.
An alternative defence that may be available to the derivative owner is
found in section 7 of the Canadian Act. Its aim is to temper the impact of the
automatic reversion of copyright precipitated by subsection 12(5). Section 7
provides that copyright in a published work is deemed not to be infringed
by "the reproduction of the work for sale" anytime after the expiration of
twenty-five years from the death of the author, if the required notice of inten-
tion to reproduce the work has been given and if a royalty of ten per cent
of the publishing price of each copy has been paid. In short, the statute
creates a compulsory licence for the entire reversionary period.
The application of section 7 to derivative works where there has been
a reversion of the underlying copyright depends on the interpretation given
to the words "reproduction of the work". Since the section does not grant a
right to reproduce the work "in any material form whatsoever," or, "to repro-
duce a substantial part of the work", a narrow construction, excluding deriva-
150 Canadian Act, s. 12(5) (where copyright has been assigned by an author other-
wise than by will, any copyright interest of the assignee will revert to the author's legal
representative twenty-five years after the author's death.) See Chappell & Co. v. Red.
wood Music Ltd., [1980] 2 All E.R. 817 at 823 per Lord Salmon (H.L.): "[T]he object
of the proviso was to safeguard authors and their heirs from the consequences of any
imprudent disposition which authors might make of the fruits of their talent and
originality."
151 Supra note 24. See also Redwood Music Ltd. v. Francis, Day & Hunter, [19781
2 R.P.C. 429 at 464 (C.A.) and Skone James, Reversionary Interests in English Copy-
rights (Munich: Verlag Franz Vahlan, 1973) at 17-21. The defendant in Redwood
Music Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 108, made an alternative argument on the basis of estoppel,
but because of his finding of an implied licence Goff J. left that argument open. It is not
clear whether evidence short of an implied licence will support a defence of estoppel.
On estoppel generally, see Habib Bank Ltd. v. Habib Bank A.G. Zurich, [1981] 2 All
E.R. 650, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1265 (C.A.).
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tive works' 52 from the ambit of the compulsory licence, appears justified.
As well, the fact, that the royalty fee is set at ten per cent of the published
price of the copies produced pursuant to the licence, suggests that the section
is only intended to permit reproduction of the work in a form substantially
similar to the form in which it was originally published.1
53
An examination of section 7 in light of its purpose suggests a wider
construction. The section seems to have been introduced to protect the inter-
ests of an assignee who has invested time and effort in exploiting the work,
but who is denied any benefits attributable to his investment after reversion.
But while the assignee who exploits the work in its original form (the tradi-
tional assignee) "has done nothing more than print, publicize and distribute
a copyrighted story or novel, a person who with the consent of the author
has created an opera or motion picture film will often have made contribu-
tions literary, musical or economic, as great as or greater than the original
author."154 If the traditional assignee's non-creative contribution is con-
sidered sufficient to warrant the enactment of a special section that allows
him to continue exploiting the work then, following this line of reasoning,
it must be the case that in a statute aimed at rewarding creativity, the deriva-
tive author or assignee was intended to receive at least similar treatment.
Section 7, construed in a fashion to accommodate this view, would go further
than its intended object; it would authorize production of new derivative
works during the reversionary period. Yet even if section 7 were to be given
its most narrow construction, thereby excluding derivative works, it would
still exceed its object of protecting former assignees. Anyone could take
advantage of the compulsory licence. Parliament must therefore have had an
additional goal in establishing this statutory defence-namely, furthering the
public interest by providing greater access to the works of a creator during
the latter period of his monopoly.155 The presence of this further statutory
objective, however, does not undercut the significance of the first goal of the
section. Therefore, as long as Parliament retains the reversionary right'5 and
at the same time chooses to soften its impact through the grant of a compul-
sory licence to reproduce the work, it is only sensible to include within the
scope of the licence a right to reproduce derivative works based on that
work.' 57
The remaining question, whether as a matter of principle lawfully created
152 See Skone James, Copinger on the Law of Copyright (7th ed. London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1936) at 85. Cf. the discussions of the meaning of "copy" for the purpose
of s. 3(2) of the Canadian Act, supra text accompanying note 129.
153 Fox, supra note 3, at 304.
154 Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. 551 F. 2d 484, 192 U.S. Pat. Q. 545 at 493 (F.
2d.) per Friendly J., (2nd Cir. C.A. 1977) Cert. denied 431 U.S. 949. See Note,
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. and the Derivative Work Exception to the Termination
Right: Inequitable Anomalies Under Copyright Law (1978-79), 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 635.
155 Skone James, supra note 152, at 81.
150 It has been recommended that the reversionary provision be abolished. See
Keyes and Brunet, supra note 41 at 76 and Torno, supra note 133 at 107-11. The United
Kingdom Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz., c. 74 has already done so.
157 MacGillivray, supra note 128, at 47 recommended a similar interpretation of the
identical provision in the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911, 1-2 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 3.
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derivative works should receive some form of special protection after with-
drawal of consent, is not to be confused with the issue of the proper con-
struction of section 7 of the Canadian Act. Upon consideration, one is hard
pressed to defend the case for any special treatment. The copyright statute
rewards creativity by granting the author the exclusive right to control his
work. A compulsory licence operates as a derogation from that scheme and
can only be rationalized on the basis of some competing interest that in
Parliament's view needs special protection.158 The derivative owner in the
Present circumstances does not represent such a special interest group. His
efforts are rewarded by the grant of copyright in any original derivative work
but he must always act subject to the rights of the underlying author.
The only argument that a licensee with an expired licence could make
in support of a right to continue to lawfully exploit his derivative work is
that since the law grants copyright in an "infringing" derivative work,159 then
the derivative author who creates with the requisite consent should receive
something more. But the creator in such circumstances is treated more favour-
ably under the present scheme, for during the term of his licence he can
exploit his derivative work with impunity. To provide him with any greater
rights would be an unwarranted intrusion into the rights of the underlying
owner. Moreover, it would discourage the derivative author from obtaining
the consent of the underlying owner for the full term of copyright. Indeed,
the derivative author caught in this plight must be seen as the author of his
own misfortune.
A reversion of the underlying copyright by law, thus terminating the
right of the derivative owner to exploit his work, presents a new obstacle
in the course. The derivative owner cannot avoid this dilemma by agreement.
Still, the derivative owner must be taken to have known of the reversionary
provision when he created his work, so there is no patent unfairness in deny-
ing him special protection. On balance, a compulsory licence in favour
of the owner of copyright in existing original derivative works created with
consent seems a satisfactory solution. As always, the rights of the derivative
owner must be balanced against those of the underlying owner. The underly-
ing owner through the reversionary provision is granted an additional right.
His beneficiaries are given one final opportunity to reap the benefit of the
author's efforts. In consideration for that benefit it seems reasonable that
the law should exact a price, which would mean for the derivative owner the
right to continue to lawfully exploit his work upon payment of a royalty.
The American solution to the same problem is subsection 203(b) (1)
of the Copyright Act of 1976.10
158 See generally Noel, supra note 75.
159 See the discussion in Part IV Copyright In An Infringing Derivative Work.
160 For a discussion of the variety of different approaches taken to this problem
under the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L No. 349, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, see Elling-
son, The Copyright Exception for Derivative Works and the Scope of Utilization (1980),
56 Ind. L.J. 1, and more recently, Comment, Russell v. Price-A Limitation on the Use
of Derivative Works (1981), 11 Golden Gate U.L.R. 323 and Jaszi, When Works
Collide: Derivative Motibn Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest (1981),
28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 715.
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A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination
may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination,
but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated
grant.
The termination of grant' 61 referred to in subsection 203 (b) (1) corresponds
to reversion under subsection 12(5) of the Canadian Act. By providing that
the derivative work may be utilized after termination of the grant according
to the "terms of the grant", subsection 203(b) (1), in essence, is exempting
the right to produce the derivative work from the operation of the termination
of the grant mechanism. Thus, if a grant of copyright provided that the under-
lying owner were to receive royalties from the exploitation of the derivative
work during the period of the grant, under subsection 203(b) (1), the pay-
ment of royalties would continue as per the agreement even after termination
of the grant.' 62 Hence, under the American scheme the derivative copyright
owner may continue to exploit his work, but the deceased underlying author's
estate is deprived of the opportunity to re-negotiate a more favourable grant.'
6 3
The fixing of a compulsory licence fee would, on the other hand, permit con-
tinued exploitation of the derivative work while at the same time allowing
for possible adjustment of an earlier inequitable royalty fee. A compulsory
licence system would therefore seem to strike a better balance.
If the reversionary provision is not abolished'6 the introduction of a
compulsory licence during the reversionary period should be considered, but
only one that is narrowly confined. It should only be available for the owner
of copyright in a derivative work that has been produced with the consent of
the underlying owner prior to reversion. In all other circumstances the deriva-
tive copyright owner who continues to utilize his work after the consent of
the underlying copyright owner has been withdrawn exposes himself to an
infringement action.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under any legislative scheme granting copyright in an original derivative
work, in circumstances where an earlier grant of copyright has exclusively
reserved to another the right to create and exploit that work, the path is set
for a collision of the rights and claims of the different creators. Canadian
copyright law clearly contemplates an overlapping of copyrights in the man-
ner just described. Section 3 of the Canadian Act, as interpreted, grants the
161 See generally Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the Copyright Act of
1976 (1977), 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 947.
102 See, e.g., Harry Fox Agency v. Mills Music, Inc. 543 F. Supp. 894 (Dist. Ct.
N.Y. 1982) (records produced pursuant to licences issued by music publisher who was
the assignee of the author's renewal copyright "were prepared under authority of the
grant" and therefore fell within the exception).
103 For criticisms of s. 203(b) (1) see Note, supra note 154; Cohen, Derivative
Works Under the Termination Provisions in the 1976 Copyright Act, (1981) 28 Bull.
Copy. Soc'y 380; Mimms, Reversion and Derivative Works Under the Copyright Acts
of 1909 and 1976 (1980), 25 New York L. Sch. L. Rev. 595.
6 4 Supra note 156.
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copyright owner the sole right to exploit his work in a wide variety of forms
and media beyond those of its original state, including the right to translate,
record or film the work. The creative effort and skill involved in so trans-
ferring the underlying work to its new condition, however, will often satisfy
the statutory originality criterion and hence entitle the new work to its own
grant of copyright. These works are referred to throughout the paper as
original derivative works. But the Canadian Act provides little insight as to
how, in practical terms, the various copyrights inter-relate and, more impor-
tant, it is silent on the consequences of one creator trespassing on the rights
of the other.
The phenomenon of multiple copyrights involved in the creation of a
single object need not generate any conflict between the creators. If the
author of an original derivative work is the owner of the underlying copy-
right or has acted with the owner's consent, then he, independently of and
in addition to, the owner of the underlying copyright, can assert his right to
prevent the appropriation of his labours against a third party.
Difficulties arise, however, when the derivative author has not obtained
the requisite consent to produce and exploit his work or where the consent
originally given is later withdrawn. Each of these difficulties will be briefly
summarized.
First, will a derivative work produced in infringement of the underlying
copyright lack originality, and therefore not be protected? While a derivative
work may not, under these circumstances, receive copyright, it is not the fact
of infringement that negatives originality. Even if the derivative work had
been produced with consent and thus not in infringement, it could nonethe-
less lack originality and would not be protected. Indeed, it is only because
the reverse is true-that a work can substantially reproduce another and at
the same time be original-that the problem under discussion arises.
Second, is an infringing derivative work denied copyright? As a general
proposition this should not be accepted. While such a rule might discourage
infringement of the underlying copyright it would do so at too great a cost
to the derivative author. Moreover, the underlying owner can always take
proceedings arising out of the infringement of his copyright. He may be able
to obtain not only monetary relief but also an injunction restraining further
exploitation of the derivative work by the derivative author. If the copyright
in any particular derivative work, such as a sound recording, is to be con-
tingent upon consent, then this can only be explained in terms of some
individual feature of the derivative work justifying special treatment.
Third, will a court refuse to enforce copyright in an infringing derivative
work? This stance would allow the courts, even without a statutory rule deny-
ing copyright in infringing derivative works, to discourage infringement of
the underlying copyright. But the conclusion of the preceding paragraph
that copyright can subsist in infringing derivative works is based on more than
simply the fact that the Canadian Act lacks an express prohibition against
granting copyright to infringing works. Given the disproportionate harm to
the creator of the derivative work, a complete denial of copyright or the right
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to enforce same is too high a price to exact in order to accomplish the objective
of discouraging infringement. Since there is no other public policy basis, as
there may be in the case of obscene or immoral works, for the courts to bar
access to the legal system, this question should also receive a negative reply.
Fourth, can the infringing derivative copyright be enforced against the
underlying copyright owner? To deny the derivative copyright owner this
right would mean that the underlying copyright owner could appropriate
the labours of another, specifically, those of the derivative author and as such
would be inconsistent with the object of the Canadian Act. Once again, this
consequence should not follow a finding of infringement. Obviously any
attempt to enforce the derivative copyright against the underlying owner
would be met by a counterclaim brought by the latter against the former.
Fifth, are copies of an infringing derivative work infringing copies of the
underlying work? In most cases they should not be treated as infringing
copies since this would allow the underlying owner to obtain, without cost,
the full benefit of the creative effort of the derivative author. Only where the
copies of the derivative work directly affect the underlying copyright owner's
ability to exploit copies of the work in its original form should derivative
copies be considered infringing copies of the underlying work.
Once consent, although present at the time of creation of the derivative
work, is withdrawn, the derivative copyright owner is to be treated as any
other infringing derivative copyright owner. If, however, the removal of the
permission to continue to exploit the derivative work is precipitated by a
reversion by operation of law of the underlying copyright then some special
accommodation, as, for example, a compulsory licence for the remainder
of the reversionary period, may be warranted.
In conclusion, it is hoped that the peculiar problems associated with
the derivative work will not escape the attention of those involved in the
upcoming reform of Canadian copyright law. As this study has indicated,
analytically, all derivative works fall into a common mold; they can both
infringe copyright and attract their own copyright. Therefore, all the practical
problems discussed above arise in relation to each type of derivative work.
But this does not mean that a uniform solution to a particular problem deals
adequately with all types of derivative work. Attention must be given to the
nature of the particular derivative and underlying work in question. Only
then is it possible to integrate a statutory solution to the question of derivative
works along the lines proposed within the structure of the Canadian Act.
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